Turkey after Erdoğan: A country, a family and an inevitable reckoning Adem Yavuz Arslan
Adem Yavuz Arslan
Recep Tayyip Erdoğan is no longer just a politician who has ruled Turkey since 2002. He is the architect of a system in which the state has been reshaped around a single man. With Erdoğan in power for more than two decades, Turkey has become a country where elections still exist but their meaning has been hollowed out; where the rule of law survives on paper, while real authority answers to one will.
During his rule, Erdoğa did not merely stretch constitutional limits — he rendered them meaningless. Although the constitution allows a president to serve only two terms, this restriction was bypassed through political engineering. The 2017 referendum marked a decisive turning point, concentrating executive power in the presidency. The 2016 coup attempt, meanwhile, became — beyond the official narrative — a justification for the mass purge of the judiciary, the military, the media and the political opposition. What followed was a state of emergency that quietly evolved into a permanent governing model.
Today, however, Turkey stands at a new threshold. Erdoğan’s serious health problems are no longer whispered rumors but a factor shaping the regime’s future. The central question is no longer whether Erdoğan will leave the stage, but who will rule after him — and by what legitimacy.
The strongest scenario: father-to-son succession
Erdoğan’s preferred outcome is clear: a controlled and risk-free transfer of power. At the center of this scenario stands his son, Bilal Erdoğan. For years, vast state resources — often invisible but highly effective — have been mobilized around this possibility. A dense network of foundations, educational institutions, cultural platforms and pro-government media has worked to polish Bilal Erdoğan’s profile as a “civilian” figure with public stature.
This is no coincidence. Erdoğan has been preparing Turkey for his son for a long time. Yet this very effort has deepened fractures within the system. Inside the ruling Justice and Development Party (AKP), particularly among its old guard, objections to what many describe as an “Azerbaijan-style model” are becoming increasingly vocal.
The most symbolic of these objections came from former parliament speaker Bülent Arınç, who publicly warned: “This is not Azerbaijan. A father-to-son transfer of power would not be welcomed.” This was more than a personal dissent — it was a sign that the regime’s legitimacy crisis is deepening.
Rivals in the shadows and a wave of purges
Bilal Erdoğan is not the only figure discussed as a post-Erdoğan alternative. The most prominent institutional rival is foreign minister and former intelligence chief Hakan Fidan, a man who long shaped Turkey’s security apparatus and maintains direct channels with international actors.
Yet a striking trend has emerged: Business groups, media outlets and senior bureaucrats known to be close to Fidan are being systematically sidelined. This is not a routine power struggle. It reflects Erdoğan’s determination to ensure that no autonomous power center survives him — especially one he cannot fully control.
Other names circulate in Ankara’s corridors of power: former interior minister Süleyman Soylu, former chief of general staff Hulusi Akar and current parliament speaker Numan Kurtulmuş. None, however, enjoys the absolute protection shield afforded to the Erdoğan family.
The Bahçeli factor: quiet but decisive
A crucial variable in this equation is the Nationalist Movement Party (MHP), Erdoğan’s indispensable ally. Its leader, Devlet Bahçeli, has avoided naming any successor but is widely understood to be uncomfortable with a Bilal Erdoğa presidency. This hesitation is not merely personal; it reflects a deeper resistance within nationalist circles to the idea of family rule.
This means the continuity of power after Erdoğan will depend not only on the palace’s will but also on the red lines of AKP and the MHP.
The likely outcome: managed chaos
Turkey has entered a familiar but dangerous phase: an authoritarian leader attempting to design the system that will follow him. Neither father-to-son succession nor open competition among regime insiders offers genuine legitimacy. The most likely outcome is therefore managed chaos — purges, shifting alliances, sudden crises and tactical compromises.
For the international community, the lesson is clear. A post-Erdoğan Turkey will not automatically democratize. On the contrary, the country may enter an even more unpredictable phase, where power vacuums are filled by authoritarian reflexes rather than democratic renewal. The decisive struggle will not take place at the ballot box but behind closed doors, within the opaque machinery of the state.
And that struggle will shape not only Turkey’s future but also the strategic balance stretching from NATO to the Middle East.
*Adem Yavuz Arslan is a journalist with over two decades of experience in political reporting, investigative journalism and international conflict coverage. His work has focused on Turkey’s political landscape, including detailed reporting on the 2016 coup attempt and its aftermath, as well as broader issues related to media freedom and human rights. He has reported from conflict zones such as Bosnia, Kosovo and Iraq, and has conducted in-depth research on high-profile cases, including the assassination of Turkish-Armenian journalist Hrant Dink. Arslan is the author of four books and has received journalism awards for his investigative work. Currently living in exile in Washington, D.C., he continues his journalism through digital media platforms, including his YouTube channel, Turkish Minute, TR724 and X.
