The opposition and the need for a constitutional front
By Hilda Tchoboian, Hrair Balian & Raffy Ardhaldjian
Civilnet
Over the past months, a series of Armenian government actions have raised profound constitutional concerns. These include brazen state interference in the affairs of the Armenian Apostolic Church, the use of legal abuses against political opponents and critics, and the weakening of safeguards meant to protect due process and institutional independence. Taken individually, each may be dismissed as isolated or procedural. Taken together, they point to a pattern that warrants a constitutional response rather than routine political debate.
Armenia’s opposition faces a simple and uncomfortable truth. While it remains divided by partisan interests and future electoral calculations, the authorities are acting quickly and in a coordinated manner to concentrate power. In moments like this, time is not neutral. Delay strengthens the executive’s escalating power grab and weakens the Republic.
There are, however, early signs that coordination is possible. While this article focuses on the Constitutional Court as the central arena for opposition action, we support the efforts of various political groups to create platforms for dialogue with one another. The recent meeting between the Armenian Revolutionary Federation and the Armenian National Congress, alongside outreach by initiatives such as Hayakve, Nzhar and other civic groups, reflects a growing recognition that threats to democratic governance require engagement across political lines, even among actors with long-standing differences. The test now is whether these efforts move beyond symbolism and translate into sustained coordination and a unified constitutional response.
The abuse of democratic norms, state interference in church affairs, and the steady erosion of civil and political rights are no longer isolated aberrations. Together, they form a clear pattern that threatens Armenia’s constitutional order. What makes this moment more dangerous is the silence of parts of civil society and much of the international community, which supported democratic institutions in Armenia for years. This silence is not due to lack of clarity, but to geopolitical convenience. The burden of defending constitutional order now rests squarely with Armenia’s political opposition and concerned institutions.
If the Republic of Armenia is to remain “a sovereign, democratic, social, and rule-of-law state” (Constitution, Article 1), the Constitutional Court must be seized and must become a focus of opposition action now.
The Constitutional Court could assume a critical role in navigating the intensifying dispute between Prime Minister Pashinyan’s administration and the Church. The court could act as the final arbiter on whether state actions, such as attempts to change church leadership or influence internal affairs, violate the separation of church and state enshrined in the Constitution. The Court could determine the limits of state intervention in the church’s internal governance, including its right to independently select its leaders. Legal experts have highlighted that any state-organized committee to replace the Catholicos would violate the Constitution’s Article 17. While the Constitution acknowledges the Apostolic Church’s “exclusive mission” in national life, the court would need to define this in relation to the secular nature of the state, particularly regarding the church’s opposition to government policies, such as the peace process with Azerbaijan. Moreover, the Court could ensure that Armenia adheres to international obligations, such as Article 9 of the European Convention on Human Rights, which mandates state neutrality and impartiality in religious matters.
This would not be unprecedented. In several post-communist European states, constitutional courts have acted as decisive checks against executive overreach and democratic backsliding. In Bulgaria, the constitutional court struck down sweeping reforms pushed through without proper constitutional authority. In Romania, the court annulled a presidential election after evidence of massive foreign interference and illegal campaign practices. In Kosovo, unconstitutional laws enabling asset seizures without due process were blocked, halting executive abuse. And in Croatia, the court intervened to prevent the erosion of the separation of powers by barring unconstitutional executive conduct. In most of these cases, opposition forces assumed a critical united role in challenging in courts the ruling executive branch of government spearheading the democratic backsliding. Armenia is not facing a unique dilemma. It is facing a familiar test of constitutional resilience.
By a united constitutional front, we do not mean a symbolic gesture or a loose political alignment. We mean an urgent, coordinated, and joint legal action in which opposition forces challenge specific government actions before the Constitutional Court on clearly articulated legal grounds. Specifically, these actions must be scrutinized under Articles 17 and 18, which mandate the separation of religious organizations and the state, and Article 4, which establishes the principle of separation and balance of powers as the bedrock of the Republic’s democracy. Scrutiny must be applied to violations of church-state separation, abuse of executive authority, infringements of due process, abuse of pretrial detention, and the weakening of institutional independence under Chapter 2 of the Constitution (Fundamental Rights and Freedoms of the Human Being and the Citizen). Such an action shifts the struggle from political arguments to constitutional judgment, where executive power is constrained not by rhetoric or street protest, but by law, and not parallel initiatives competing for attention. A united and urgent constitutional challenge is both necessary and possible.
Critics will argue that a Constitutional Court “captured” by the executive makes legal action futile. This skepticism, while understandable, misses the strategic necessity of the move. Filing these cases creates an undeniable legal record, forcing the judiciary to choose between the Constitution and executive will. Even if the court fails to act, the process exhausts domestic remedies and provides the objective preconditions required for international scrutiny by international bodies such as the European Court of Human Rights. The goal is to hold a mirror to Armenian justice; a ruling that ignores the facts and the law becomes an indictment of the system itself.
Such a united constitutional front should not be limited to political parties alone. It must include former presidents, parliamentary and extra parliamentary opposition forces, respected legal professionals, and credible civil society figures. While the court’s proceedings are legal in nature, the political weight of the broad backing matters. Armenia is not an isolated political unit.
All three former presidents, Levon Ter-Petrosyan, Robert Kocharyan, and Serzh Sargsyan, together with opposition parties and public figures, have the standing and responsibility to act together. This is not about reopening old political disputes or restoring past systems. It is about using the constitutional mechanisms that still exist while they still matter. This collaboration does not require a permanent merger of divergent opposition organizations or the erasure of ideological differences. Instead, we call for a tactical “unity of purpose” to protect the rules of the game. Rival factions need not agree on the past to agree that the Constitution must remain the supreme authority today. By pausing rivalries for this specific legal challenge, the opposition proves it can prioritize the Republic’s survival over personal ambition.
The issue is larger than the fate of any one leader. The real question is whether Armenia remains a constitutional republic governed by limits on executive power, or whether it continues toward authoritarian executive dominance and selective application of the law. State involvement in the affairs of the Armenian Apostolic Church is not a side issue. It is a constitutional violation with deep legal and civilizational consequences. The same applies to political pressure, due process violations, and the growing normalization of rights abuses.
To date, the opposition has failed to form a united front ahead of crucial elections with existential consequences. Yet a shared constitutional action now could generate the momentum that the only possibility for electoral success has not. It would signal discipline, seriousness, and a commitment to the Republic above personal ambition.
History will not judge the opposition by how often it warned of danger or complained, but by whether it acted when the constitutional alarm was loud and clear. The mechanism exists. The moment is narrow. The responsibility is collective. If the Republic is to be saved, it must be defended now!
Let us put aside our partisan interests and divisions. Let us learn to overcome our internal squabbles to act collectively. Let us form a united constitutional front.
# # # #
Hilda Tchoboian is President of the Covcas Center for Law and Conflict Resolution. She was the founding president of the Euro-Armenian Federation for Justice and Democracy, and a member of the Regional Assembly of Rhône-Alpes in France. She is the coordinator of LIBERTAS Collective for the liberation of Armenian Hostages.
Hrair Balian practiced conflict resolution and human rights for 35 years in the Balkans, Eastern Europe, Caucasus, Central Asia, Middle East, and Africa. His book “Anatomy of Peacemaking: Nagorno-Karabakh Conflict and Missed Opportunities” will be published in English (February 2026, Palgrave Macmillan) and in Armenian (March 2026, Newmag).
Raffy Ardhaldjian is a Fletcher School graduate and advisor to boards, public institutions, and Technology firms. In his spare time, he writes about pan-Armenian topics spanning Armenia and the Armenian Diaspora.
