In the fall of 2020, the world watched grainy drone footage from a war in the South Caucasus and drew a fast conclusion: the tank was dead, the infantryman was obsolete, and the future of war belonged to unmanned systems. It was a compelling story. It was also wrong.

Last week, Dr. Liam Collins and I released our new book, The War for Karabakh: Strategy, Technology, and Victory.

It is the first in-depth military history of how Azerbaijan won back Karabakh and its occupied territories after nearly three decades: the long preparation, the 44-day war in 2020, and the operation in September 2023 that ended the conflict in less than twenty-four hours.

Here is the short version of what we found. Drones were present and did matter, but the war’s decisive battles, like Shusha, were fought completely without them. Multiple battles and key moments were won by soldiers on foot, climbing cliffs with heavy loads and fighting at close range or the innovative miss of mechanized and motorized forces attached to special operation units. These facts and the reality of what actually happened should make every military rethink the lessons it thinks it learned from Karabakh.

Why this war matters

The 2020 Karabakh War arrived at the worst possible time to be studied. It was fought at the height of COVID. Very few journalists were on the ground, even less western journalists. Then came Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine and the war in Gaza, and the analysts who should have been studying Karabakh turned elsewhere. For years, neither side was willing to discuss the details of the war. The result was a war remembered mostly through drone clips and second-hand reporting.

Not studying the 2020 Karabakh was a mistake for three reasons:

1. It is a masterclass in grand strategy. After a crushing defeat in 1994, Azerbaijan spent more than twenty-five years using every tool of national power to prepare for one objective. Its economy grew from roughly 90 percent of Armenia’s in 1992 to more than three times Armenia’s by 2020. It modernized its military and changed its doctrine from Soviet to NATO.
2. It was rapid and decisive. At a time when many believe modern wars inevitably grind into stalemate, as in Ukraine, Azerbaijan won in 44 days in 2020 and in under 24-hours in 2023.
3. It ended a “frozen” conflict. Nagorno-Karabakh sat on the same list as Abkhazia, South Ossetia, and Transnistria. Almost no one thought it would be resolved. But it was, by force, and the map of the South Caucasus changed with it.

How we wrote it: boots on the ground

Liam and I are retired Special Forces and Ranger soldiers who fought in Iraq and Afghanistan. We’ve done field research on wars in Sri Lanka, Colombia, Georgia, India, Israel, Gaza and Ukraine, and we’ve learned one thing above all: there is no substitute for walking the terrain.

So that’s what we did. We walked and drove every major battlefield of the war, often standing in both the Armenian and the Azerbaijani positions to see the fight from each side.

• Over 93 Azerbaijani interviews, from the Minister of Defense and every corps commander of both the 2020 war and the 2023 operation, down to staff officers and enlisted soldiers.
• A dozen Armenian veterans, from a conscript private weeks into his service to battalion commanders and senior colonels.
• Commanders’ battle maps, official histories, press releases and social media, cross-checked against each other and against the ground itself.

We understood that memories were imperfect, and many participants had an agenda. That did not make figuring out what happened impossible. When officers from the same battle disagreed, we put the maps on the table until they reached a consensus. When a story of heroism didn’t match the terrain, we threw it out. The Armenian government was less open than Azerbaijan’s, as losing sides usually are, and we’re upfront in the book about what that means for our sources.

Five things the war actually teaches:

1. Strategy wins wars before the first shot. Nations often claim to have a strategy, but few do, especially a grand strategy. Azerbaijan held one national objective for nearly thirty years and aligned its economy, diplomacy, information campaigns and military reform behind it. It balanced Turkey and Israel against Russia and Iran without provoking either. It even used a 2016 Four-Day War as a live test of its army before the war in 2020. Armenia, by contrast, planned to hold a static line until diplomacy or Russia stopped the fighting. When neither happened, it had no alternative plan despite their defensive advantages.

2. Technology amplifies. It doesn’t decide. Some studies credit Azerbaijani drones with 63 percent of Armenian vehicle kills. From imagery alone, you often can’t tell a drone strike from an artillery round or an anti-tank missile. Azerbaijan started the war with a limited number of strike drones, constrained by weather, terrain and maintenance. At Shusha they were grounded by fog or close to the Armenian border electronic warfare and other sources prevent drone use. In 2023 drones played an even smaller role. Azerbaijan won anyway. Militaries that bet everything on unmanned systems are making the oldest mistake in the book: overrating the newest technology. All warfare is a combination of the old and new, those that miscalculate the need of the two come up wanting.

3. Soldiers still decide wars. Only ground forces can seize and hold terrain. From Hadrut to Shusha, small units moved through forests, climbed ridgelines, infiltrated obstacle belts, cleared trenches and fought building to building. Azerbaijan built a professional core of special operations forces and commandos inside a largely conscript army, then put mechanized brigades under their command when the mission demanded it. That is a force-design lesson every army should study.

4. Speed is a weapon. When Azerbaijan had their breakthrough at Jabrayil, its units were exhausted. Commanders pushed on anyway, because a pause would have given Armenia time to build new defenses, reposition reserves, and reconstitute. Mission command made Azerbaijan’s tempo possible: junior leaders understood the intent and acted without waiting for orders. Armenian units, under a centralized command culture, often waited for orders that came too late or never came at all.

5. Cities are key terrain, and they must be defended. Hadrut had about 3,000 residents. Shusha had fewer than 4,100. Yet each controlled a decisive terrain. Shusha is a fortress city on a sheer plateau that should have been one of the most defensible positions in the region. Armenian forces largely defended from outside the towns instead of inside them, giving up every advantage urban terrain offers a defender. Shusha fell in days, the Lachin corridor was cut, and the war was over. As someone who has spent years studying urban warfare, I found these decisive urban battles the most striking lessons of all.

What’s inside

The book is about 330 pages with 16 original maps, so you can follow every major battle on the ground.

1. The Roots of the Conflict and the First Karabakh War: how Azerbaijan lost Karabakh and seven surrounding districts, nearly 14 percent of its territory, by 1994.
2. A Grand Strategy: how Azerbaijan prepared its nation for war from 1994 to 2020.
3. Operation Iron Fist: the opposing war plans, and why Armenia’s proved so fragile.
4. Penetrating the Impenetrable Barrier: the first ten days and the breach of Armenia’s defensive line.
5. Exploiting the Breakthrough: the battles of Hadrut, Emirvarly, and Fuzuli.
6. The Southern Advance: the liberation of Zangilan and Gubadli.
7. Ending the War: the Battle of Shusha.
8. The 2023 “Anti-Terrorist” Operation: securing Karabakh in twenty-four hours.
9. Conclusion: the lessons for militaries and policymakers far beyond the Caucasus.

A note on what the book is not. It is not a moral judgment on either side, and it does not cover alleged war crimes. Behind every map is a human cost, including the flight of some 100,000 Karabakh Armenians in 2023. Our focus is how and why the war was won.

Early reviews.

“This book is a must-read for political and military leaders.” Lt. Gen. H.R. McMaster (ret.), 25th U.S. National Security Advisor

“The definitive account of the Karabakh wars, moving past the tired ‘drone war’ caricature to reveal what actually delivered victory.” Gen. Joseph L. Votel (ret.), former Commander, U.S. Central Command and U.S. Special Operations Command

“A masterful analysis of one of the defining but often overlooked military campaigns of the twenty-first century.” Gen. David Petraeus (ret.), former Director of the CIA

“This is far more than the history of a recent war.” Gen. Stanley A. McChrystal (ret.), former Commander, ISAF and JSOC

“Essential reading for anyone concerned with modern technology and its interaction with strategy.” Stephen Biddle, Columbia University, author of Military Power

Get the book

The War for Karabakh is available now in paperback, hardback, ebook and Kindle.

Order on Amazon · Paperback ISBN 978-1-63857-439-2 or at Cambria Press