Armenia’s Deepening Conflict between State and Church
The unprecedented anti-church campaign launched in Armenia at the end of May of this year, which is comparable only to the early Soviet years in terms of the severity of the measures, seems to cross all red lines. High-ranking clergy members are being arrested, the Prime Minister makes defamatory statements against the incumbent Catholicos and threatens to dethrone him, and law enforcement officers invade the country’s main church. What are the main drivers of these events, and what impact could they have on regional stability?
An Armenian Orthodox Church (Image Courtesy of GetArchive.net)
BACKGROUND: There are several reasons behind the current conflict between the Armenian government and the church. The current Armenian government of Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan and the Armenian Apostolic Church have never been allies. Clashes with the church started from the very first days the revolutionary government came to power in 2018. The prime minister has regularly criticized the church hierarchy for its connections with the former authorities, which he calls a “criminal regime.” Looking back, it should be noted that, unlike with the current authorities, there were never issues with the Catholicos and the public during the three previous presidents’ rule. The incumbent Catholicos Karekin II was elected in 1999 during the administration of the first president, Levon Ter-Petrossyan, and has and still maintains very close relations with the latter. During the administrations of the second president, Robert Kocharyan, and the third president, Serzh Sargsyan, the Catholicos was treated respectfully, and there was mutual understanding and support from the government to the church. There were even accusations that the Catholicos was obviously backing Kocharyan’s and, specifically, Sargsyan’s regimes and interfering in the political life of the state.
However, after the revolution in 2018, there were actions that appeared to be initiated by Pashinyan against the Catholicos, with a view to discrediting his reputation. In particular, from June to October 2018, protest rallies were held in which the participants demanded the resignation of Karekin II, whom they considered to be allied with the former authorities and accused of being involved in shady business deals.
Critics brought forward the narrative that Karekin II was “closed and shadowy,” he is believed to be too involved in business – a claim given greater weight by the discovery of a million-dollar Swiss bank account in his name. In 2015, an investigative report revealed that he had a million-dollar Swiss bank account, but the leaked files do not specify the exact role that Karekin II had in relation to the account, and the press spokesman of Catholicos said it was opened by his predecessor and used to help the Church.
The movement against the Catholicos, dubbed “New Armenia, New Patriarch,” has been holding rallies in downtown Yerevan, recording video appeals against Catholicos, and picketing his office in Echmiadzin, even pushing and grabbing him, as seen in an extraordinary video that shocked Armenians both for its aggression against the Catholicos and for the surprising vulnerability he displayed.
Nikol Pashinyan, during that period, stated that he was not going to intervene to reduce tensions against the Catholicos and emphasized the separation of church and state. However, as the movement failed to receive public support and was viewed rather poorly, Pashinyan’s targeting of the church ceased for a while.
After the defeat in the 2020 Second Karabakh War, pressure on Pashinyan grew and Church leaders called for his resignation. The Catholicos urged Pashinyan to step down “to prevent further shocks, possible clashes, and tragic consequences to the public, to elect a new prime minister in consultation with political forces and to form an interim government of national accord.”
After this, the relationship between the Catholicos and Pashinyan deteriorated irretrievably. On the one hand, the Armenian Church remains the only state institution that maintains independence from Pashinyan and his team. Moreover, the religious structure more than once spoke out from nationalistic positions, becoming a stronghold of protest sentiments. Last spring, it was the hierarchs of the Armenian Apostolic Church who spoke out against the delimitation of the border with Azerbaijan in the Tavush region. Local archbishop Bagrat Galstanyan then became the leader of the resistance movement. First, he led a march from the line of contact to Yerevan and then held several large rallies in the Armenian capital. The movement was also supported by the central leadership of the Church. The Investigative Committee of Armenia unfolded allegations that Galstanian had begun preparations for the violent overthrow of the government in November 2024 with the members of his opposition-backed movement.
In a statement, the Committee alleged that the group had planned to assassinate unnamed “civilians,” take other violent actions, and paralyze the country’s security apparatus for that purpose. According to official information, Galstanyan was planning to “form 200 groups of militants, each with 25 people, in order to occupy parliament.” He allegedly discussed this with Levon Kocharyan, the son of Armenia’s second president and a member of parliament. As a result of this, Galstanyan and 14 supporters were arrested on June 26.
However, this process of repression was not limited only to Galstanyan’s arrest. Archbishop Mikayel Ajapahyan, the leader of the Shirak Diocese, has also been arrested, charged with “usurpation of power and overthrow of the constitutional order.” Samvel Karapetyan, an Armenian billionaire with Russian citizenship, who recently expressed his willingness to support the Armenian Apostolic Church, was also arrested. He is also accused of inciting a coup d’état. The Investigative Committee claims that these three individuals played a role in a terrorist act being prepared against the state.
The government’s campaign against the church and recent arrests have been criticized by Armenian civil society. More than two dozen non-governmental organizations and human rights defenders are raising the alarm that the authorities are interfering with the autonomy of the Armenian Apostolic Church, violating the Constitution and the Law on Freedom of Conscience and Religious Organizations, as well as the principle of the independence of the judicial system.
IMPLICATIONS: The government-church conflict in Armenia should not be viewed solely as an internal political process within the country. It eventually has a broader scope, and in some sense fits into the realm of global processes taking place in the world, given the trends of separation of church and state and the “secularization” of spirituality in the world. According to the Constitution of Armenia, the church is separated from the state ( Article 7.1. ), nevertheless, since its formation, it has enjoyed state support and actively participated in the country’s political processes: there are also known periods in Armenian history when, in the absence of a state, the church assumed the role of the state itself.
As for the role of the church in Armenia today, it has broad public influence, but no legal powers or duties. When it comes to bringing a clergyman into the legal arena, it leads to a tension of sentiments, because neither in terms of public perception nor in terms of law are there regulations aimed at clarifying the powers of the church and the government. Meanwhile, the Armenian Church enjoys a strong reputation both inside the country and in the Armenian diaspora. According to the results of the 2011 census in Armenia, about 97 percent of the country’s population are followers of the Armenian Apostolic Church. Further aggravation of church-state relations could lead to civil conflict within the country and pose a threat to the re-election of the current authorities in the upcoming parliamentary elections in 2026, which, in turn, could abort the efforts of the current authorities to normalize relations with Azerbaijan and Turkey.
The ruling party is approaching the election campaign in a difficult position. This spring, representatives of the ruling “Civil Contract” party lost two key positions in the mayoral elections in Gyumri and Parakar. Surveys indicate that the same result could be seen at the national level. According to a survey conducted by MPG/Gallup International Association in January of this year, the support for the pro-government “Civil Contract” is only 11 percent. At the same time, the church enjoys considerable trust among the population. According to the Caucasus Barometer, a national household survey conducted by the Caucasus Research Resource Center (CRRC), which sampled 1,561 people aged 18 and over in Armenia between July and October 2024, about 79 percent of Armenian residents expressed trust in the Armenian Apostolic Church, making it the highest figure among public institutions.
It is likely that the church will support the opponents of the ruling party, thereby increasing their chances of victory. Perhaps the campaign to discredit the clergy was launched by the authorities in order to prevent such a scenario. Moreover, the authorities may want to provoke some protests now so that by the election date, they will have already fizzled out. However, the crisis that has arisen threatens a split. If Pashinyan succeeds in changing the Catholicos, then opposition-minded citizens of Armenia and parishes in the Diaspora may not recognize the first hierarch appointed after political interference.
This conflict between the government and the church in Armenia could lead to a dangerous point, when external forces could take advantage of this situation and try to implement some of their plans through the Church or interfere in the internal affairs of the country. All this can fit into Russia’s plans, for example, which wants to strengthen its position in the South Caucasus, and considers the Armenian church as a factor of influence in the region. It is worth mentioning that the brother of Karekin II is the Primate of the Russian Armenian Diocese, and Samvel Karapetyan has great financial resources, has created tens of thousands of jobs in Armenia, and Pashinyan and his team are wary that he could fund large demonstrations and achieve a change of power in Armenia backed by Russia. The opposition and the Armenian Apostolic Church, Armenian businessmen in Russia, and the Armenian community in Russia may unite around Karapetyan, which could lead to Pashinyan’s resignation. It is no coincidence that Russian public figures affiliated with the Kremlin have issued severe condemnations of the Armenian authorities’ attacks on the church, including a statement by Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov, who described the attacks on the Armenian Apostolic Church as “deeply worrisome and unjustified.” Lavrov’s statement was immediately followed by a harsh response from Armenian Foreign Minister Ararat Mirzoyan, urging him “not to interfere in the internal affairs of the Republic of Armenia.”
The Kremlin is keen on the dominance or victory of Echmiadzin in this conflict, on the basis not of Christian solidarity but geopolitical interests. The Kremlin seeks to destabilize the situation in Armenia and create a chaotic and uncontrollable situation. Even if the current weakened government remains in Armenia, its dependence on the Kremlin will only increase under such unstable conditions.
Ultimately, this conflict may weaken the position of Christianity in the South Caucasus. It is no coincidence that the Chairman of the Caucasus Muslims’ Board (CMB), Sheikh-ul-Islam Pashazade, encourages this conflict and regularly criticizes the Armenian Church, considering it a “threat to neighbors.”
CONCLUSIONS: It is obvious that the reasons for the conflict between the government and the church are political. The current authorities and the Church elite have many controversies, including on issues of fundamental importance for Armenia. The authorities see the Catholicos and the bishops as yet another political opponent, against whom they are applying all available tools. Nevertheless, what is most disturbing is that the ruling party and the Prime Minister himself are fueling this rift by employing aggressive methods that threaten both democratic norms and religious freedom. Instead of stabilizing the situation, they often exacerbate tensions by using divisive rhetoric and targeting individuals, setting a dangerous precedent for political debate. This behavior threatens to deepen existing divisions within society at a crucial stage for Armenia’s democratic development. Such escalations threaten to further split Armenian society, influence the results of the upcoming elections next year and negatively affect the peace negotiations with Azerbaijan– something that in turn will affect the entire region. Pashinyan’s course aims to form a “homogeneous political space,” but risks defeat in parliamentary elections and a premature resignation from power and politics. In this case, there is a significant risk that Armenia will revert to a Russian orientation, despite Russia’s gradual decline in influence in the South Caucasus today.
AUTHOR’S BIO: Anna Vardanyan is an independent journalist-researcher based in Yerevan. For ten years she has worked as a Communications expert and Media advisor to the Vice-President of the Parliament of Armenia. She has been working as an accredited journalist at the Constitutional Court of the Republic of Armenia.
