Parallels Between the “Real Armenia Ideology” and Soviet and Turkish Approaches to the Armenian Diaspora

Vahan Zanoyan
A new controversy has emerged in the inter-Armenian political discourse: A group of eight
prominent Diasporan Armenians issued a statement calling for an end to the conflict between
the Armenian government and the Armenian Apostolic Church. The statement was widely
distributed. Soon thereafter, another prominent Diasporan Armenian, Dr. Garo Armen, issued
a statement criticizing the group’s statement.
I will not dwell on the relative merits of the two statements. That is not the intention of this
commentary. But I would like to focus on just one sentence in the statement of the group
which appears to have offended certain readers.
The controversial statement in question is: “Even if unintentional, the Armenian
government’s approach is risking severing its relations with the Diaspora—something not
even the Ottoman Empire or the Soviet Union were able to do.”
The statement has been severely criticized for all kinds of reasons, including its alleged
historical “inaccuracy” and the inappropriateness of comparing the current government’s
policies with those of the Soviet Union and the Ottoman Empire.
But the off-hand dismissal of the statement as “false” risks missing a very important point in
the current national crisis facing Armenia and the Armenian nation, which is the destructive
degree to which the State agenda and interests have been distanced from the broader National
agenda and interests.
The fact is, that both Turkey (granted, not the Ottoman Empire, since there was no Diaspora
as we know it today during the Ottoman Empire) and the Soviet Union have indeed tried to
drive a wedge between the Armenian Diaspora and Armenia. The evidence is overwhelming.
The Soviet Union was wary of nationalistic ideas entering Soviet Armenia through Diasporan
thought leaders. People with ties in the Diaspora, including even relatives, were looked upon
with great suspicion and often persecuted. Diasporan literature was prohibited to enter Soviet
Armenia. It was nonetheless smuggled in and secretly devoured by such intellectual giants as
Raphael Ishkhanian, Babken Chugaszyan, Silva Kaputikyan, Hamo Sahyan, Hrand
Matevosyan, Razmik Davoyan, Sos Sargsyan, Abraham Alikyan (who lived in Moscow at
the time) and countless others, who secretly passed the prohibited periodicals to each other,
often risking their safety and even their lives. This applied not only to certain periodicals
published by the Dashnak Party (such as Pakine and Aztag Weekly), but almost all Diaspora
publications were subjected to strict censorship and scrutiny.
Thus, it is not only true that the Soviet Union actively tried to drive a wedge between the
Diaspora and Soviet Armenia, but it is also true that it ultimately failed, at least it failed to

achieve the extent of separation that it wanted, largely because of the patriotism of Soviet
Armenian intellectuals.
As for Turkey, it has had an open and declared dislike of what it calls the “external” and
“Diasporan” influences and constraints on the policies of the Armenian Republic, especially
since Armenia’s Independence. Both the former foreign minister of Turkey, Ahmet
Davutoghlu, and President Erdogan have made several public statements bemoaning the
“negative influence” of the Diaspora on the policies of the Armenian Republic. As recently as
2024, Erdogan announced that “Armenia would be closer to peace with Azerbaijan if it rids
itself of external influences and dependence on the Diaspora.” The Turkish government has
repeatedly tried to encourage the Armenian government to separate and exclude the Diaspora
from policy decisions of the State.
The attempts of the Soviet Union became a serious hurdle in Diaspora-Armenia relations, but
as mentioned earlier, they could not kill it. As for Turkey’s policy of aiming to exclude
Diaspora influence, it too did not succeed. The fact that these two policies failed is evident in
the enormous flow of resources—material, human and cultural—from the Diaspora into the
newly Independent Armenia.
It was not until the emergence of the “Real Armenia Ideology” propagated by the current
government that the separation between national and state agendas not only widened to
alarming levels but was also formalized as Armenian State policy. The “Real Armenia
Ideology” has many highly questionable and debatable tenets, but most of those fall out of
the scope of this article and require separate discussion. Here, I will focus on only one central
tenet because it pertains to this issue, namely, equating the Motherland with, and restricting it
to, the current internationally recognized Armenian State—i.e., the 29,743 sq kms, a map of
which the Prime Minister likes to wave while expounding on the new “ideology.” Everything
that falls outside that area, is officially excluded from the concerns and responsibilities of the
State and is not considered to be part of the Motherland.
No Armenian government has ever formalized the separation of State and National agendas
to this extent. When patriotism was not as discredited as it is by today’s Armenian
government, it kept the link between the two agendas alive. This was true during the darkest
days of Soviet Armenia, it was true during the first Republic, in the Declaration of
Independence, during the Third Republic, and even during the first two years of the current
government—until the military defeats of the 2020 44-day war. It was after that war that the
current government came up with “Real Armenia Ideology” out of the political necessity to
justify or explain the losses. The final loss of Artsakh in September 2023 was the fait-
accompli that fully formalized the “ideology” on practical grounds.
Let me hasten to add that Statehood is, and should be, the ultimate and absolute value for the
Armenian nation, which has been deprived of it for far too long. But the exclusion of all
national interests, history, heritage, causes, indicators of historical identity and symbols of
Armenian spirituality that fall outside the internationally recognized borders of today’s
Republic of Armenia from the notion of the Armenian “Motherland” is not “ideology,” it is

extreme minimalistic denialism. And it certainly is not, nor has it ever been, part of the
legitimate aspirations of the Armenian nation.
The critics of the controversial statement in question have also often labeled it “infuriating.”
But if we replace the words “Ottoman Empire” with “Turkey,” the statement is largely
correct, and should have led to intellectually honest reflection rather than infuriation.
Today’s Armenia is in fact different from Soviet Armenia, and different from the first
Republic. But the fact remains that patriotic and nationalistic ideas prevalent in the Diaspora
were regarded as dangerous by both the Soviet Union and by Turkey, and today, they are
regarded as dangerous by the government of the Republic of Armenia. So not only the
syndrome is comparable, but also the driving impetus behind the syndrome is comparable.
Thus, the key message of that “offending sentence” happens to be true—namely, that the
Armenian government, through its “Real Armenia Ideology,” has succeeded to formalize a
clear and absolute distinction between Armenian National and State interests, while both the
Soviet Union and Turkey had tried to do the same and failed to achieve the same degree of
separation as we have now.
Probably the worst kind of misinformation is that which comes from people who are
supposed to know better, such as historians, professors, scholars. When they start distorting
historical facts, and misinterpreting policies and what truly lies behind them, they do more
damage to the overall national historical and political discourse than ordinary laymen acting
or speaking out of ignorance.
The controversial statement cited above was proclaimed to be not only “infuriating” and false
but also reflecting the “extreme ignorance” of the authors about history. I would argue that
people making such statements are themselves either ignorant about history, or much worse,
are prepared to knowingly distort the historical facts in pursuit of political objectives.