Pashinyan’s sharp U-turn on nuclear energy raises questions over whether his government is attempting to appease Russia.

Gor Madoyan

OC Media

Armenia, as the only country in the South Caucasus with a nuclear programme — the Metsamor Nuclear Power Plant — faces a difficult choice. According to the best estimates, the current reactor is scheduled to end its service life by 2036. This means the construction of a new power plant is already overdue, given an average construction timeline of 10–12 years. The existing facility dates back to the Soviet era, with the Russian state corporation Rosatom serving as its operational partner and primary maintenance provider.

Armenia now stands at a new crossroads: should it continue its cooperation with a sanction-hit Russia and Rosatom through a complex web of strained relations, or choose another option — such as proposals from the US, South Korea, France, or even China — for either modular or classic nuclear reactors?

Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan has spent the last few years seeking alternatives, including accepting funding and resources from the US. Yet recently, it is becoming increasingly difficult to dismiss the Russian option as a merely hypothetical alternative.

Whatever happens, very little time remains for a final decision and the launch of the process. Armenia is inevitably faced with a choice that, no matter how much the Armenian authorities label the decision ‘exclusively economic’, is deeply political, geopolitical, and security-driven.

The metamorphosis of Pashinyan’s speeches

Pashinyan first began discussing the need for a new nuclear power plant, and issues with the overall state of Armenia’s energy infrastructure, in May 2023. At the time, he noted that there were problems with the 1,000-megawatt Russian option, arguing that American modular plants were more suitable.

By January 2024, during a meeting with the Nuclear Safety Committee, Pashinyan was already speakingabout the political component of the new plant, stating that he considered small modular reactors politically attractive.

Nine months later, while speaking at the World Armenian Summit in Yerevan, Pashinyan announced that a strategic decision had been made: Armenia would have a modular plant.

‘We have had a comprehensive discussion on this and made that decision. Now the next question is: with whom are we going to build it, with whom are we going to partner?’, he asked at a subsequent parliamentary session, adding: ‘We have said very transparently that at this moment we want to receive proposals, and today we are having such conversations with the United States, Russia, China, South Korea, and France’.

During US Vice President JD Vance’s trip to Armenia in early 2026, it seemed like a decision had been made. Indeed, in February, Vance announced an agreement on the construction of American small modular reactors in Armenia, calling the deal ‘a classic win-win for both Armenia and the United States of America’.

‘It means small modular reactors; American technology is going to be coming to this country. And again, it’s one of the few countries where we feel confident enough to invest at this level, to send this kind of technology and it’s happening because of the Prime Minister’s leadership’, Vance said at the time.

A month later, in March, Pashinyan repeated the sentiment at the Second Nuclear Energy Summit in Paris. He declared once more that Armenia had chosen the modular reactor path, though he hedged any statements about what country they might partner with.

By September, however, Pashinyan’s rhetoric and tone had shifted dramatically.

First, he met with the head of Russia’s Rosatom Corporation, Aleksei Likhachyov, in Yerevan. During the meeting, Pashinyan emphasised that the final decision would be purely economic in nature, taking into account price, quality, safety, timelines, and guarantees.

Then, on 1 October, Pashinyan announced that Armenia’s energy priorities had changed: they had discovered that Armenia would need much larger volumes of energy, and that the energy and capacity produced by modular reactors would not be sufficient.

‘Armenia has become an electricity-deficit state. Already approved investment projects are of such a scale that Armenia already faces a power deficit. That is to say, our entire surplus is being fully consumed by investment projects, and therefore we must think about what to do […] Previously, I said dozens of times that we needed nothing more than a modular nuclear plant. That was our position. But now, due to this shift, we must realise that a modular plant, in all probability, will not be enough for us’, he said.

Just a week after that meeting, Rosatom confirmed that the Metsamor Nuclear Power Plant could continue operating safely until at least 2031, with the prospect of further extending operation up to 2036.

A lack of adequate assessment

Pashinyan has justified this pivot by pointing to anticipated surges in electricity demand driven by new investment projects and AI infrastructure. For instance, in one of his recent interviews, Pashinyan statedthat ‘Amazon is ready to invest in Armenia if round-the-clock, stable power supply required by the company can be guaranteed’.

However, behind these and similar statements, there are no concrete economic calculations, contracts, formal investment pipelines, or solid justifications. It remains unproven that Armenia specifically requires a 1,000-megawatt capacity plant; justifying such a need would require updated forecasts and rigorous economic modelling, which currently does not exist.

Curiously, Pashinyan’s ‘re-evaluation of demand’ coincided with Rosatom’s offer for a VVER-1000 reactor.

At the same time, alongside restrictions on Armenian exports to Russia, there are active discussions in Russia regarding a potential price hike for gas, and the impossibility of transferring the concession of the Armenian railway network from Russia to third countries. While these ‘coincidences’ are not direct proof of Russian pressure, Pashinyan’s sharp U-turn occurs against this backdrop. It raises questions over whether his government is attempting to appease Russia through concessions or offers of new economic projects.

Furthermore, choosing a new nuclear power plant is not merely a question of construction cost. Equally vital is the operational outlook, which could lock Armenia into system-level dependence on Russia’s energy sector for decades — both economically and technologically — through nuclear fuel supplies, maintenance, and technical dependencies.

Ultimately, while the economic growth argument is logical, it is not yet sufficient to prove that a 1,000-megawatt plant is necessary. Russia’s political influence and pressure are no less important variables in this equation, but an accurate assessment of their decisive role can only be made by comparing open competition criteria, potential participants, and submitted proposals.

In any case, it is at the very least striking to declare Armenia’s strategic preference for modular reactors for years, to speak of cooperation and prospective deals with the US, and then suddenly, almost overnight pivot toward a new Russian reactor proposal. This is reminiscent of how former Armenian President Serzh Sargsyan brought Armenia into the Russian-led Eurasian Economic Union. If this pivot does go ahead, it would be a continuation of Armenia’s deep energy, economic, and technological dependence on Russia.