A Review of Artur Khachatryan’s Work Titled Artsakh Negotiations
A two-volume work by public and political figure Artur Khachatryan, titled Artsakh Negotiations: Chronology, Documents, Settlement Proposals, and Adopted Decisions (1988–2001) (Yerevan: self-published, 2025) has recently been published. The author has undertaken a comprehensive and large-scale effort to uncover the content and timeline of documents and decisions of significant political and historical relevance related to the Artsakh negotiation process.
Volume I examines the origins of the Artsakh Movement, focusing on the landmark decisions of February 1988 and December 1989. It also discusses the adoption of Armenia’s Declaration of Independence, the proclamation of the Republic of Nagorno-Karabakh amid the dissolution of the Soviet Union, and the formation of its governmental institutions. In recounting the early stages of the movement, Khachatryan makes special mention of Igor Muradyan, who had been actively involved in the Nagorno-Karabakh issue even before the movement gained mass public support.
Muradyan and two of his associates were later removed from the leadership of the movement by the Karabakh Committee. At the time, this removal was justified by claims that members of the Committee possessed “undeniable evidence” linking Muradyan to the KGB (Committee for State Security). Years later, this raises the question: who, other than the KGB itself, could have provided such “undeniable evidence”?
The author also highlights the July 8, 1992 decision of the Supreme Council of the Republic of Armenia, which declared any document referring to Nagorno-Karabakh as part of Azerbaijan to be unacceptable. This decision was primarily the result of efforts by parliamentary factions within the opposition “National Alliance.” Notably, this principle was upheld throughout the entire negotiation process up to 2018, and Armenia’s highest legislative body did not adopt any document contradicting it.
The study also analyzes four United Nations Security Council resolutions. Khachatryan presents evidence that Azerbaijan rejected Resolutions 874 (1993) and 884 (1993), as both linked the withdrawal of local Armenian forces from areas surrounding Artsakh to the convening of the OSCE Minsk Conference, which was expected to determine the future legal status of Nagorno-Karabakh. It is important to note that these resolutions were adopted to support a comprehensive settlement proposal and an action timeline presented by the Minsk Conference member states. Notably, they also called for the withdrawal of Azerbaijani forces from the Martakert region of Nagorno-Karabakh.
In the context of more recent developments, documents concerning the 1994 Budapest Summit, the establishment of the OSCE Minsk Group Co-Chairmanship, and the confirmation of its mandate are of particular significance.
Volume I also includes early drafts of conflict settlement proposals, ranging from the Zheleznovodsk Communiqué to the Key West talks.
Volume II presents documents related to the updated Madrid Principles and the Kazan negotiations. Of particular interest are materials from meetings in Dushanbe, Saint Petersburg, Davos, and Vienna, as well as the so-called Lavrov Plan. The volume also covers the final stage of the negotiations, which ultimately collapsed, leading to renewed hostilities and the forced displacement of Armenians from Artsakh.
As stated in the foreword, the study doesn’t focus on the Artsakh Movement or the armed conflict itself, but rather on the diplomatic negotiation process. This focus enhances the value of the work, as it avoids duplicating the content of existing publications while fully acknowledging their contributions.
Artur Khachatryan’s research is expected to serve as an important bibliographic resource for the study of contemporary Armenian history and the development of a national diplomatic school.
