Armenia: political tensions mount as 2026 elections approach
With the 2026 parliamentary elections looming, political tensions in Armenia are escalating sharply. Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan finds himself navigating a turbulent landscape shaped by controversy over foreign policy, shrinking public support, and an emboldened opposition now eager to exploit any and every misstep in lieu of possessing any credible policy of its own.
The stakes are high and the coming year will determine not only the future of Pashinyan’s government, but also Armenia’s nascent but still flawed democratic development.
In March, the run up to local elections was “marred by criminal investigations, political manoeuvring and allegations of corruption – tactics we may see more of ahead of the 2026 elections”, the Stockholm Center for Eastern European Studies concluded. “The government’s attempts to suppress local opposition reflect its broader concerns about the emergence of genuine challengers at any level”.
Pashinyan’s push to normalize relations with Azerbaijan and Turkey is likely to take center stage and his opponents accuse him of betraying national interests. These accusations have found fertile ground amid growing nationalist rhetoric and public discomfort over Armenia’s increasingly strained relationship with Russia. Recent polling show diminishing enthusiasm for his much touted pivot toward the West even if it could be nothing more than symbolic.
Public opinion appears more pragmatic than ideological.
Meanwhile, Pashinyan appears increasingly frustrated and prone to sudden outbursts and threats as he did this month, losing his temper during a parliamentary session, lashing out at opposition MPs that accused his party of corruption. Whether this was an impulsive outburst or a deliberate warning, it confirmed the growing sense that Pashinyan is under immense pressure.
The situation has not been helped by pro-government municipal officials assaulting an opposition-aligned blogger in Yerevan or recent government warnings that the government might curb press freeedom if the media fails to self-regulate itself. There are growing concerns that 2018’s initial hopes for democratic reform under his premiership were premature. Many instead say the country is backsliding.
Recent polling from MPG / Gallup International, conducted from 29 April to 2 May, continues to paint a bleak picture for Civil Contract’s electoral prospects. Only 11 to 11.5 percent of respondents said they would support the current government if elections were held this month.
In contrast, about 12 percent backed opposition parties loyal to former presidents Robert Kocharyan and Serzh Sargsyan. Some 28 percent are either undecided, plan to spoil their ballots, or reject everyone.
Geopolitically, the Armenian public remains hesitant about a full Western alignment. Despite Pashinyan’s efforts to distance Yerevan from Moscow, 60 percent of poll respondents still want Russia involved in negotiations with Azerbaijan.
Support for EU membership has also slipped from 51 percent in January to 37 percent in May. Many Armenians remain wary of burning bridges with Moscow given the country’s continued reliance on Russian energy and trade.
Pashinyan’s decision to attend this year’s Victory Day parade in Moscow, despite warnings from the EU, underscores this dependence. While the gesture likely irritated Brussels, skipping the event would have risked further economic and diplomatic fallout with Russia. Armenia remains trapped in a delicate balancing act that could prove difficult to maintain for much longer.
Though divided, some opposition MPs are again floating Pashinyan’s impeachment before the next elections even if the likelihood of success remains low. National Assembly Speaker Alen Simonyan is optimistic, however, claiming Civil Contract will win more than 50 percent of the vote in 2026. Most others remain highly skeptical. If that is the case then Pashinyan would not maintain absolute power over parliament unless legislative changes occur.
His much touted “peace agenda” with Azerbaijan is also shaping up to be a major election issue. In March, Yerevan and Baku announced that the text of a long overdue peace agreement had been finalised. Azerbaijan, however, insists that any deal cannot be signed until Armenia amends its constitution and agrees to dissolve the OSCE Minsk Group. The EU and U.S. are pushing for a resolution, eager to secure a trade corridor through the Caucasus to Central Asia bypassing Russia.
Domestically, the public remains skeptical. The latest MPG poll shows that 86 percent of Armenians want the text of the peace agreement disclosed before it is signed. Pashinyan has promised to do so but only once signing is imminent. Until then, confusion and division lingers. While his approval numbers hover around 11.5 percent, traditional opposition parties fare even worse. Only 8 percent support parties aligned with Kocharyan, and less than 4 percent back those tied to Sargsyan.
The country appears increasingly disillusioned with its entire political class, potentially leaving space for third forces, particularly those unconnected to the post-Soviet establishment, to appear and fill the void though are yet to materialise.
“It is possible to bring people to the streets, but it is very difficult to keep them there with unrealistic statements and patriotic appeals instead of political programs,” political scientist Arman Grigoryan recently opined in local media. This risks the spectre of instability as the country’s Foreign Intelligence Service warned in its first annual public report published in January.
Senior officials say that Russia has engaged in hybrid warfare since Pashinyan’s 2018 rise to power. Moscow denies such accusations, but the information space is already saturated with competing narratives, both domestic and foreign, with the mechanisms to spread them already long in place. The stakes could not be higher, especially in the spheres of security and stability.
If a peace deal with Azerbaijan fails to become actual or the opposition makes further gains electorally, Armenia may be plunged into deep political uncertainty and crisis. The election will prove a test not just for Pashinyan but for the country’s own ability to determine its future free from external influence and interference for the foreseeable future.
