At a government session on Thursday, Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan presented the government’s action plan for the next five years, until the next nationwide elections. The document spans a wide range of policies, including national security, the economy, democratic reforms, and public administration, and will need to pass a vote in parliament.

“The 2018 revolution had a specific action plan, but [shortly] after [our] government came to power, in 2019-2020 and thereafter, it was forced to engage in crisis management, first because of the COVID-19 pandemic, then because of the [2020 Karabakh] war and the post-war situation,” Pashinyan said at the session.

However, he added that the peace treaty with Azerbaijan, which was initialed at the White House in Washington last August, and the overall progress in normalization with Baku would allow the government to return to what it had failed to achieve following the 2018 revolution.

National security and foreign policy

On foreign policy, the government says it “will pursue a balanced foreign policy, which has shown its effectiveness.” The action plan sets out 15 key points, with the priority being what the government refers to as “institutionalization of peace with Azerbaijan and border demarcation,” specifically by boosting “contacts and bilateral trade between the civil societies and business communities” of the two nations.

This marks a notable departure from the previous action plan Pashinyan’s government presented in 2021, where the top priority was listed as ensuring the rights and security of Karabakh Armenians, as well as the peaceful settlement of the Karabakh conflict. That was followed by the goal to “continue to strengthen and expand allied relations and strategic partnership with Russia,” including military, trade and transport cooperation.

In the realities of 2026, however, Armenia has effectively abandoned all military tieswith Moscow, faced Russia’s sweeping trade restrictions (which many economists describe as a trade war) and seeks to regain control of its rail network from Russia’s concession.

The years-long crisis in relations, which has so far seen Moscow’s failure to respond to Azerbaijani incursions into Armenia’s internationally recognized territory in 2022, the inaction of its peacekeepers during Baku’s 2023 ethnic cleansing of Karabakh, and overall political pressure on Armenia have relegated Russia to only 8th place in the new policy plan, saying Armenia should “aim at transforming, developing and deepening relations [with Moscow] in the new circumstances.”

The government’s second-most important foreign policy direction is Turkey. The goal is to establish diplomatic relations with Ankara, open the shared border, shuttered on Turkey’s orders in 1993, and operate at least two checkpoints on that frontier. Yerevan will also relaunch and expand transport, energy and digital infrastructure, and promote bilateral and multilateral trade.

In May, Turkey lifted its decades-long restrictions on direct trade with Armenia, but other goals listed in 2022 at the start of the normalization process remain unfulfilled due to Azerbaijan’s influence on Ankara’s policy on the matter: Baku objects to full normalization before it signs a full peace treaty with Yerevan.

On policy toward the European Union, the document does not say Armenia should formally apply for membership in the next five years. Instead, the goal is to pursue implementation of the existing Comprehensive and Enhanced Partnership Agreement with the bloc, align with EU standards regarding the rule of law and the economy, as well as continue work toward visa-free travel to the EU.

In cooperation with the United States, the so-called Trump Route project is mentioned as the priority. This plan envisions a transport route connecting mainland Azerbaijan with Nakhichevan through Armenia with Washington’s assistance.

Other important foreign policy directions remain France and Georgia, with no specific goals mentioned, as well as Iran, Armenia’s southern neighbor that, according to the document, will continue cooperation with Armenia on transport projects such as the North-South corridor.

Economy policy

On the economy, the action plan says Armenia’s foreign trade policy will aim to diversify the structure of export markets. This is a clear reference to Moscow’s trade sanctions introduced earlier this year, which put most of Armenia’s exports in limbo, as they had been almost exclusively destined for Russia for decades.

The goal is also to double the volume of domestically produced exports, while adjusting legislation to improve the environment for foreign investment. The plan also aims to establish a vast corporate securities market by attracting major reputable companies and brands. Additionally, it pledges to remove unnecessary bureaucracy for businesses and move most administrative proceedings fully online.

While it includes sections promising improvements in agriculture and industrial output, the pivot is clearly toward knowledge-based and innovative sectors such as high tech, AI and science.

The plan sets a goal of increasing research spending to 1% of GDP and reaching $500 million in annual high-tech exports. It also says Armenia will encourage the widespread use of AI tools in the economy and establish an agency to manage the country’s AI policy.

The plan also introduces a project to create at least one national laboratory for AI engineering and continue developing an interconnected ecosystem of AI factories of various purposes and scales, which it refers to as the “AI Garden,” attracting both international and local investors.

Energy policy

The action plan says Armenia should continue diversifying its energy mix, including by boosting renewable energy production. A sharp increase in solar power generation seen in recent years is expected to persist.

Yerevan also hopes to continue utilizing nuclear energy. Armenia’s Metsamor nuclear power plant will need to be decommissioned within the next ten years as it reaches the end of its service life. The plan says Armenia should start constructing a replacement as soon as possible and sets a target of making a final decision on its design by the end of next year.

The issue has a major foreign policy dimension. Russia, which provides maintenance and nuclear fuel for the existing plant, says it would like to be in charge of constructing its replacement, but the alternative is the United States. In February, Yerevan and Washington signed an agreement that would allow the U.S. to share civilian nuclear technologies with Armenia, fueling speculation that the Pashinyan government is seeking to have the new facility designed and built by the U.S.

The plan also says that normalization with Azerbaijan and Turkey could allow the country to “expand new energy corridors,” without being more specific. Armenian lawmakers have already acknowledged that Yerevan could diversify its energy supplies by importing Azerbaijani gas if Baku’s pipeline transits Armenia, and Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev has also said this is possible.

As of now, Armenia imports a minor share of its gasoline from Baku, although most vehicles in the country either run on electricity or liquefied petroleum gas.

Public administration and democratic reforms

The action plan envisions significant reforms to Armenia’s penal system, largely by expanding probation capabilities. This is something the government has put major efforts into in recent years, resulting in Armenia leading European rankings for probation expansion.

As part of efforts to rehabilitate and resocialize prisoners, the plan pledges to expand education and employment opportunities for convicts, both in prisons and on parole. It also aims to move away from the existing Soviet-era penitentiaries, with a goal of constructing at least one modern penal institution with significantly improved conditions for inmates.

On human rights, the document pledges to introduce comprehensive anti-discrimination legislation, while also focusing on combating domestic violence and strengthening personal data protection. Some of these reforms largely align with the European Union’s roadmap for visa-free travel that was handed to Armenia last November.

Yet another section of the reforms pertains to the government’s plans to adopt a new constitution. The need for change was first introduced by Pashinyan in 2020, but in recent years it has become widely viewed as a concession to Azerbaijan, which demands a constitutional amendment as a condition for signing a full peace treaty, claiming the current constitution contains a legal claim on Nagorno-Karabakh.

While Pashinyan rejects the allegation and insists the issue is Armenia’s own domestic matter, the government is pushing for a new constitution anyway, rather than simply amending the existing one. The action plan outlines the goal as “protection of human rights, improving the separation of powers and ensuring checks and balances.”

While it says the new constitution will be put to a referendum, this might become an issue: following the nationwide elections held in June, Pashinyan’s Civil Contract party fell short of winning the parliamentary supermajority of two-thirds of seats required to initiate a constitutional referendum.

Diaspora policy

The action plan says the government intends to redefine its relations with the diaspora, building them around Pashinyan’s “Real Armenia” ideology. This concept suggests giving up ambitions to seek repatriation to – or regain control over – regions historically populated by Armenians, such as Karabakh and Western Armenia, focusing instead on positioning the Republic of Armenia as the home for all Armenians.

The concept is widely criticized in the diaspora and viewed by many as a defeatist policy void of historical justice, but the government argues it is the only way to survive against external challenges.

The action plan says educational and cultural ties are supposed to contribute to integration between Armenia and the Diaspora, and also pledges to support Armenian-language teaching for repatriates. However, given the difficult relationship between the current government and the diaspora, the action plan does not appear to be very enthusiastic about mass repatriation.

Moreover, the plan confirms the government’s intention, first announced last week, to tighten rules for ethnic Armenians applying for citizenship. According to the plan, the new legislation will introduce a residence requirement for diasporans before they are granted nationality. Neither public statements from officials nor the action plan have so far disclosed how long applicants will be expected to reside in Armenia.

Previous statements from public officials explained that fast-track citizenship in recent years had allowed tens of thousands of diasporans to receive passports for international travel – without having any real connection to the country.