Declassifying Defeat: Armenia’s Incomplete Release of Documents

BY HRAIR BALIAN
CivilNet

On 2 December 2025, Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan published 13 batches of documents related to Nagorno-Karabakh mediation and negotiations on the government website. This fulfilled a promise made a month earlier to release “key” negotiation documents by year-end. However, the selection was unusual; some were made public for the first time and others were already in the public domain for decades.

Published Files

The published files, listed chronologically, include:

1. Four UN Security Council Resolutions (1993), public since 1993.
2. CSCE Budapest Summit documents (1994), public since 1994.
3. OSCE Lisbon Summit Chairman-in-Office statement and Armenia’s rebuttal (1996), public since 1996.
4. Two OSCE Minsk Group proposals (1997 & 1998), in public domain since the late 1990s.
5. A 1999 draft agreement (territorial swap), which was reproduced from a 2008 newspaper article, not an official archive.
6. OSCE Minsk Group’s Basic Principles (2007), public since 2008.
7. OSCE Minsk Group’s Basic Principles Kazan variant (2011), partially public since 2011.
8. “Lavrov Plans” (2014-2015), not previously published.
9. “Lavrov Plans” (2016), not previously published.
10. President Serzh Sargsyan’s letter to President Vladimir Putin (2016), not previously published.
11. Paragraphs from an OSCE Minsk Group paper (2018), not published previously.
12. National Assembly session transcript (17 April 2018), public since 2018.
13. OSCE Minsk Group proposal (2019), not previously published.

Documents Missing

Despite the release, the selection remains highly selective and omits crucial documents. Notably missing are:

1. The authentic October 1999 draft agreement, which was reproduced from an article in Haykakan Zhamanak published in 2008 when Pashinyan was the editor-in-chief of the newspaper, rather than released from official archives. According to declassified U.S. Department of State documents, on 26 and 27 October 1999, Deputy Secretary of State Strobe Talbott submitted a confidential document for consideration to the two presidents in Baku and Yerevan and their teams.
2. The April 2001 Key West negotiation documents, which the government claims not to possess—a claim that lacks credibility given their significance.

Reasons for Releasing the Documents

A government declaration advances the following seven unconvincing arguments, frequently echoed by the Prime Minister:

1. Negotiation Focus: Talks were centered on returning seven regions to Azerbaijan and determining Karabakh’s status within Azerbaijan’s territorial integrity—not on independence or unification with Armenia. The declaration then cites the 1996 OSCE Lisbon Summit to justify its conclusion, ignoring President Levon Ter-Petrosian veto at the summit.

2. International Perception: The declaration overlooks the evolution of global views on Karabakh’s self-determination after the Lisbon Summit to include cessation and independence. Otherwise, it is hard to explain the half a dozen statements by the presidents of the U.S., Russia, and France between 2008 and 2013 supporting the Minsk Group co-chairs’ proposed “expression of will” or referendum for the possible separation of Karabakh from Azerbaijan.

3. Legal Principles: It misinterprets the intersection of territorial integrity and self-determination in international law. The two rights coexist in numerous UN and OSCE documents are conditional – territorial integrity is contingent on the government claiming it to be representing the whole population of its territory, and self-determination through secession is a last resort remedy. In the case of Karabakh, the ultimate undermining of self-determination highlights the limitations of international law. Powerful actors can create facts on the ground that override legal principles, resulting in a gap between normative principles and their practical application in the face of realpolitik considerations.

4. Referendum Scope: It incorrectly claims any referendum would include all of Azerbaijan, while proposals specify a vote by Nagorno-Karabakh’s population. The Minsk Group’s June 2019 proposal clearly stipulates “a popular vote … expressing the free will of the population of Nagorno-Karabakh”.

5. Document Continuity: Argues no new proposals emerged after 2018, but this is misleading. The government argues that the 2019 proposal refers to the “President of the Republic of Armenia, not the Prime Minister.” At the very least, this is a frivolous argument. The 2019 proposal was a reiteration of the 2016 and April 2019 “Lavrov Plan” with some updates. Prime Minister Pashinyan’s rejection of the Minsk Group’s legacy, including the Madrid Principles, proved highly consequential, exasperating the mediators.

6. Security Concerns: Cites President Sargsyan’s letter to Putin, highlighting security risks and negotiation challenges. One can debate President Sargsyan’s assertions in the letter, but at the very least, he was engaging constructively with one of the Minsk Group co-chairs, Russia, suggesting remedies to security concerns, and negotiating instead of ignoring or outright rejecting the proposal as Pashinyan did in 2019.

7. Interim Status: Claims interim status and referendum discussions undermined Karabakh’s independence, which is not supported by the proposals. The Madrid Principles and the 2019 Minsk Group proposal offered a broad interim status for Nagorno-Karabakh, anchored in a UN Security Council mandate, which would have considerably stabilized its de facto independence and transformed it into a subject of international law.

Political Motivations and Impact

These selective disclosures appear timed to influence domestic politics ahead of the June 2026 parliamentary elections. By highlighting past negotiation failures, the government seeks to shift responsibility for the loss of Nagorno-Karabakh onto previous administrations. Additionally, the government may be attempting to divert attention from the ongoing and highly contentious government meddling in the internal tensions within the Armenian Apostolic Church, a clear violation of Armenia’s Constitution. Moreover, the government is likely trying to divert attention from the eroding human rights conditions in the country, including the arrests of dozens of opposition leaders and supporters, and the abuse of pretrial detention.

The released documents have sparked heated public discussions and a significant backlash from the Armenian opposition, which accuses the current government of selective publication to support its narrative. Also, the opposition argues that the pre-2020 proposals were infinitely better than the current reality.

Missed Opportunity

The June 2019 OSCE Minsk Group proposal represented a major opportunity for a peaceful resolution, offering interim status and international guarantees for Nagorno-Karabakh. The Armenian government’s failure to engage with this proposal contributed to the subsequent conflict and loss of territory.

The June 2019 OSCE Minsk Group proposal was the latest iteration of the Madrid Principles and marked a significant advance in the resolution of the Karabakh conflict. The proposal consisted of three parts: (1) Declaration on the First Stage and Further Steps in the Nagorno-Karabakh Settlement; (2) Statement by the Russian Federation, the United States of America, and the French Republic in Support of the Declaration on the First Stage and Further Steps in the Nagorno-Karabakh Settlement; and (3) draft resolution by the UN Security Council.

The interconnected “ultimate goals” of the proposal were: (1) “return to Azerbaijan of seven districts” (except the Lachin Corridor); (2) “determination of the final status of Nagorno-Karabakh through a popular vote conducted at times agreed by the parties, under the auspices of the UN or OSCE, expressing the free will of the population of Nagorno-Karabakh, … any result of which will be respected by the parties”; (3) and “full normalization of political, trade-economic, humanitarian and other relations in the region, restoration of good-neighborly cooperation”.

In the first stage, the proposal required the return to Azerbaijan of five districts (Agdam, Fizuli, Jebrayil, Zangelan and Qubatly) “as soon as the International Peacekeeping Forces (IPF) are deployed and international security guarantees are given through a UN Security Council resolution authorizing the deployment of IPF.” Armenians who had settled in those territories will leave and Azerbaijani “civil authorities” will enter there “after the deployment of IPF and the redeployment [meaning withdrawal] from these districts of the [Armenian] troops currently located there. The five districts returned to Azerbaijan will remain demilitarized. IPF will be deployed on the administrative border of the former NKAO, with the exception of its section with the Kalbajar and Lachin districts, which remain under OSCE observation”. Unstated is the stipulation that the status quo of Armenian control over those two districts will continue.

The sides will “undertake not to use force against each other” and the blockades will be lifted. “Nagorno-Karabakh, until the issue of the final status of NK is resolved, will be recognized with the support of the co-chair countries of the MG as having rights ensuring the organization of full-fledged life activities…. The security of NK … will also be ensured by Azerbaijan’s commitment not to use force against NK, the IPF operation, Armenia by virtue of its special relations with NK, the co-chair countries of the OSCE Minsk Group and the UN Security Council as the body that authorized the deployment of IPF.” Unstated here is that no change is required to the status quo of Nagorno-Karabakh’s self-defense forces.

In the draft statement of the three Minsk Group co-chair countries, all three permanent members of the UN Security Council, the above proposed provisions were further clarified. During the interim status until the final status determination, Nagorno-Karabakh would enjoy “democratic formation and functioning of legislative, executive and judicial authorities and local self-government elected by the population of NK; observance of basic human rights and freedoms; political and economic viability and security through its own self-defense and law enforcement forces; receipt of assistance from foreign states and international organizations provided that it is intended to promote human rights, peaceful economic and democratic development, cultural and trade cooperation, or for humanitarian purposes; the possibility of attracting direct investment and access to international markets”.

Further, the three co-chair countries will ensure the “participation of representatives of Nagorno-Karabakh in OSCE meetings at which topics related to NK are discussed, as well as NK’s implementation of external relations”.

Pashinyan failed to appreciate the significance of stabilizing Nagorno-Karabakh’s status quo, gaining international recognition of its status quo and de facto independence from Azerbaijan, endorsed by the OSCE participating states including Azerbaijan, and more significantly endorsed by the UN Security Council. The arrangement would have granted Nagorno-Karabakh a status akin to Kosovo’s interim administration, which in due time opened the door to the international recognition of their independence.

The Minsk Group co-chairs’ 2019 proposal would have “legitimized” the status quo of Nagorno-Karabakh’s existence in the eyes of the international community and the unrecognized de facto republic would have been endowed with all of the attributes of independence save membership in the UN, acknowledged in an international document endorsed by the UN Security Council, albeit until further determination of final status at some undetermined future date, if ever. At the very least, Armenia could have accepted the proposal as a basis for further discussions, which would have fixed Nagorno-Karabakh as a de jure participant in subsequent negotiations.

The 2019 proposal was like the Minsk Group’s September 1997 proposal, which Azerbaijan had accepted and then President Levon Ter-Petrosian urged to accept. However, his Prime Minister at the time, Robert Kocharyan, and ministers Serzh Sargsyan and Vazgen Sargsyan rejected, forcing the president’s resignation. Nagorno-Karabakh also rejected this proposal. The 1997 proposed stabilization of the status quo was also akin to Kosovo’s interim administration status that eventually opened the door to the international recognition of independence. This was a historic missed opportunity in 1997, especially taking into consideration Azerbaijan’s rare acceptance of the proposal at the time.

The rejection of the 2019 Minsk Group proposal was an equally, if not more historic, missed opportunity. Prime Minister Pashinyan did not respond to the 2019 Minsk Group proposal for months, but his conduct and discourse signaled rejection. His rejection of the proposal in April 2020 was irresponsible at the very least, especially taking into consideration that Azerbaijan had not rejected the proposal.

Considering Azerbaijan’s preparations for an alternative to a negotiated agreement (the use of force) had decisively tilted the balance of power in its favor—Armenia should have been extra cautious. It should not have alienated the three Minsk Group co-chair countries, all permanent members of the UN Security Council, and the international community at large. Instead, by scuttling a settlement highly favorable for the Armenian side and by rejecting the entire Minsk Group legacy, in essence Armenia insulted the international community and further isolated itself at a critical moment. Most astonishingly, “the Armenian government avoided substantive negotiations on [the 2019 Minsk Group proposed] package, giving Azerbaijan the opportunity to legitimize its … aggression. This is the key difference between the current government and all previous ones.”

Ultimately, the rejection of the 2019 Minsk Group proposal was not the only cause for the Nagorno-Karabakh catastrophe. Multiple failures in the negotiation process spanning three decades contributed, including both sides’ maximalist approach, lack of public preparation for compromise, the Armenian side’s overestimation of its negotiating position, Azerbaijan’s systematic strengthening of its capacity to wage war, its alternative to negotiations, Armenia’s post-2018 irresponsible rhetoric and deeds, and the Minsk Group mediation’s structural weaknesses and conflicting interests.

Conclusion

This examination reveals how miscalculations, maximalist demands, exclusion of key stakeholders, lack of public preparation for compromise, and ineffective mediation techniques collectively led to the ethnic cleansing of Nagorno-Karabakh’s Armenian population in 2023. Ultimately, the catastrophic outcome for Nagorno-Karabakh was avoidable. The case serves as a sobering lesson in conflict resolution, demonstrating the catastrophic human consequences when mediators fail to balance the principle of territorial integrity without credible security guarantees for vulnerable populations against the principle of self-determination.

Hrair Balian practiced conflict resolution and human rights for 35 years in the Balkans, Eastern Europe, Caucasus, Central Asia, Middle East, and Africa. His book “Anatomy of Peacemaking: Nagorno-Karabakh Conflict and Missed Opportunities” will be published in English (February 2026, Palgrave Macmillan) and in Armenian (March 2026, Newmag).