How to Effectively Engage Azerbaijan in Trump’s Regional Plans and in Israel’s Interests: Practical Recommendations

By Zeev (Vladimir) Khanin and Alex Grinberg

The Begin-Sadat Center for Strategic Studies

The concept and recommendations presented below were developed by the authors, who are Israeli experts, based on discussions with several former Israeli diplomats and ex-Knesset members, as well as with several American and Azerbaijani Jews. What unites us all is a commitment to strengthening regional alliances and deepening Israel’s integration into the “Greater Middle East.” Our approach is guided solely by the long-term interests of the Jewish state.

The authors have not coordinated their position with any official representatives of Azerbaijan. Therefore, it is only natural that situations may arise where Azerbaijani officials express opinions that contradict the authors’ perspective.

On January 15, we published a conceptual paper titled “Azerbaijan: One of the Pillars of Israel’s Regional Security System – A Brief Overview for the Trump Administration“. This publication is based on statements from Israeli officials, including heads of government and numerous ministers, as well as materials from Israeli media and think tanks covering the strategic partnership with Azerbaijan from 1995 to 2024.

Our “brief overview for the Trump Administration” sparked widespread discussion in Israel, the U.S., and, quite unexpectedly, even in India. Prestigious publications and think tanks that referenced it or analyzed our data and conclusions included: Atlantic Council, Forbes, The National Interest, Townhall, The Jerusalem Post, Israel Hayom, and The Economic Times. The document was discussed during the recent forumon religious tolerance, convened by the U.S. Jewish organizations in Congress, with participation of the congressmen, legislative staffers, and State Department representatives. The booklets containing our analysis were distributed among them.

As the office of Foreign Minister Gideon Sa’ar informed the chief rabbi of Baku’s Sephardic community Zamir Isayev, the BESA report from January 15 “serves as an example of the importance of Israel-Azerbaijan relations and presents the substantive richness of their ties in the most positive light. A copy has been provided for [personal] review by Foreign Minister Sa’ar.” Our briefing also garnered significant interest among senior officials of major Jewish organizations in the U.S. Moreover, we have reliable information that several members of the new president’s inner circle have carefully reviewed the BESA report.

As a result, in recent weeks, we have been contacted by Knesset members, prominent figures in American Jewry, and representatives of leading conservative think tanks in the U.S. Many of them noted that, despite their deep understanding of Middle Eastern realities, they had never considered Azerbaijan’s geopolitical significance specifically within the framework of Israel’s regional strategic security architecture. Furthermore, our interlocutors emphasized that they share this broader vision of Israel’s ally in the Caucasus. At the same time, they raised an important question: What can be done to elevate Azerbaijan’s regional status and rebrand it in the eyes of the new administration in a way that would further strengthen Israel’s position? Initially, we addressed this question individually for each inquiry. However, as the number of such requests continues to grow, we decided to prepare another report—this time with practical considerations. But first, let us revisit the key indicators of Azerbaijan’s special significance from the perspective of Israeli interests, as outlined in our previous publication.

Key Indicators of Azerbaijan’s Special Role for Israel

• Among all Muslim-majority countries, Azerbaijan has the longest-standing and most comprehensive partnership with Israel.

•  It is the only strategic partner in the Muslim world of the U.S.’s main ally in the Middle East that shares borders with both Iran and Russia.

•  The long-term partnership between the two countries positions Azerbaijan as one of the pillars of Israel’s regional strategic security architecture. This is reflected in three areas that are vital to the Jewish state:

1. 1. 1. For 30 years, this Muslim-majority country has been a key pillar of Israel’s energy security, serving as its largest supplier of energy resources. Israel’s economic growth in the 1990s and 2000s was significantly supported by Azerbaijani energy supplies. In 2024, during the war with Hamas and Hezbollah, when the IDF had an urgent need for an uninterrupted fuel supply, Azerbaijan increased its oil exports to Israel by 55%.
      2. Azerbaijan is one of the largest importers of Israeli defense products. The billions of dollars generated from these deals not only support the livelihoods of many Israelis working in the defense industry but also fund new military developments essential for Israel’s own security.
      3. Azerbaijan is one of Israel’s key partners in countering Iran. Both countries view the Ayatollah regime as an existential threat and have been cooperating in this context for many years.

• Despite pressure from Iran and Turkey, during Israel’s war against Hamas and Hezbollah, Azerbaijan not only maintained but even intensified its partnership with Israel. This occurred at a time when all other moderate Muslim-majority countries, including those that signed the Abraham Accords, distanced themselves from the Jewish state. A similar situation occurred during the Second Intifada (2000–2004), when Azerbaijan remained Israel’s only reliable partner in the Muslim world.

• The special importance of Azerbaijan for the Jewish state is recognized by representatives of all major political factions in Israel, even those that often disagree on other foreign policy issues. Thus, the significance of the partnership with Azerbaijan falls within the framework of a broad Zionist consensus.

• Azerbaijan serves as a model of Muslim-Jewish coexistence and actively facilitates Israel’s engagement with other Muslim countries. Prime Minister Netanyahu has described this as an example of “how Muslims and Jews work together to secure a better future for both.” According to recent report by the Institute for Monitoring Peace and Cultural Tolerance in School Education (IMPACT-se), a British nonprofit organization that analyzes schoolbooks and curricula around the world, Azerbaijan has become the first Muslim-majority country to include a definition of antisemitism in its textbooks. The report emphasized that Judaism is “highly regarded in the textbooks,” and the books also correctly portray the Holocaust as a genocide of six million Jews, highlighting antisemitic measures such as arbitrary killings and imprisonment rather than trying to downplay or deny the Nazis’ atrocities.

Current Geopolitical Clarifications 

Against the backdrop of the Trump administration’s efforts to reshape the global order, Azerbaijan’s significance—both for U.S. and Israeli strategic interests—has grown even further. This is driven by key trends in Washington’s new foreign policy approach, within which Azerbaijan’s advantages and capabilities can be effectively leveraged:

• Setting the stage for the normalization of U.S.-Russia relations. It is important to consider that, under Western sanctions, Russia’s dependence on Azerbaijan for exports to Iran and the Middle East has sharply increased. A significant portion of Russian freight transport in the southern direction passes throughAzerbaijan (from 2021 to 2023 alone, the capacity at the land border tripled).

• The desire to exert maximum pressure on Iran to force it to abandon its nuclear program.

• Implementation of a comprehensive plan for integrating Israel into the “Greater Middle East” through Saudi-Israeli normalization, expansion of the Abraham Accords, and inclusion of the Jewish state in regional development and defense projects. As noted in our previous material, Azerbaijan has facilitated Israel’s efforts to establish relations with the Gulf monarchies, particularly the UAE, as well as other moderate Muslim countries. Furthermore, since 2008, official Baku has served as an unofficial communication channel between Ankara and Jerusalem.

• A policy of strengthening regional alliances among U.S. allies to reduce American defense expenditures. In this context, Azerbaijan serves as a model of long-term military-strategic partnership between a Muslim-majority country and the Jewish state. The impact of this cooperation can be significantly enhanced by integrating bilateral defense projects with specific areas of military collaboration between Israel and the U.S., as well as between Israel and the UAE—and, in the longer term, with certain other Gulf monarchies.

How Israel and Pro-Israel Forces in the U.S. Can Leverage Azerbaijan in Trump’s Plans for Restructuring the “Greater Middle East”

1. In the U.S., Azerbaijan is predominantly perceived through the lens of certain lobbyists who claim to represent Armenian interests and have close ties to the Democratic Party. To advance their own agendas, they extensively exploit the memory of the tragic events of the Armenian Genocide in the Ottoman Empire. At the same time, a deliberate effort is made to portray Azerbaijan as a puppet of Turkey. From this, the conclusion is drawn that Azerbaijan is allegedly seeking to repeat the genocide. This statement is completely refuted by Azerbaijan’s entirely independent stance on its partnership with Israel. In 2024, amid Israel’s war against Hamas and Hezbollah, Ankara persistently pressured official Baku to halt its cooperation with Jerusalem. However, Azerbaijan, on the contrary, intensified this partnership. Unfortunately, even those American Jews who wholeheartedly support Israel are often unaware of the unique role this Muslim country plays in the regional security architecture of the Jewish state. Therefore, it is crucial for pro-Israel forces in the U.S., both Jewish and non-Jewish, to stop viewing Azerbaijan through the narrow narratives promoted by certain factions within the Armenian diaspora. It is essential to view Azerbaijan within a broad regional perspective. This is especially important as the Trump administration works to pressure Iran and to further integrate and solidify Israel’s presence within the framework of the “Greater Middle East.” As for certain ethnic lobbyists linked to the Democratic Party, even Armenian Prime Minister Pashinyan has distanced himself from their outdated positions. This suggests that their primary concern is not the well-being of modern Armenia but rather the preservation of their own status and influence in American politics. As a result, they seek to perpetuate hostility and mutual grievances between Armenians and their closest neighbors, even at the expense of Armenia’s legitimately elected leadership. Meanwhile, Yerevan and Baku are engaged in negotiations to reach a peace agreement and renounce territorial claims. Applying pressure on Azerbaijan through the lens of century-old narratives only complicates the process of normalizing Armenian-Azerbaijani relations. Of course, it is entirely legitimate that certain politicized diaspora figures have personal interests that do not necessarily align with the position of official Yerevan. Likewise, it is equally legitimate that pro-Israel forces in the U.S. have their own interests in strengthening Israel’s role in integration processes with the moderate Muslim world and in countering Iran. It is within this context that Azerbaijan’s regional significance should be understood and promoted. And there is no need to shy away from this: this stance is not anti-Armenian but rather pro-Israel. Moreover, it fully aligns with the strategic foreign policy priorities of the Trump administration.

2. The foundations of the Israel-Azerbaijan partnership were laid in the U.S. exactly 30 years ago. This took place during a meeting between the leaders of the two countries, Yitzhak Rabin and Heydar Aliyev, in New York in October 1995. However, according to a December 2024 assessment by the leadership of the American Israel Public Affairs Committee (AIPAC), Azerbaijan’s longstanding support for Israel and its contribution to regional stability have not been adequately recognized by the United States. Moreover, since 1992, the U.S. Congress has enforced “Section 907,” a legislative amendment that discriminates against Azerbaijan compared to other post-Soviet republics in terms of receiving American assistance. After September 11, 2001, the Bush administration managed to secure only a temporary suspension of this amendment due to the need for security cooperation with Azerbaijan—a collaboration that ultimately proved highly effective. However, to this day, the amendment remains an obstacle to the development of U.S.-Azerbaijan relations. This has led to an absurd situation in which the U.S. provides extensive financial and political support to Muslim countries that only agreed to recognize Israel and establish diplomatic relations in 2020 under the Abraham Accords. Meanwhile, the only Muslim country that has been a reliable strategic partner of America’s key Middle Eastern ally for three decades receives no U.S. support and has, in fact, been subject to sanctions from Washington throughout this entire period. For the U.S. and Israel to fully leverage Azerbaijan’s advantages and opportunities within the new “Greater Middle East” architecture being shaped by the Trump administration, it is essential to eliminate the existing formal obstacles. Section 907 must be repealed.

3. Azerbaijan should be included in the “Abraham Accords Club”. The Muslim states that signed the Abraham Accords in 2020 received significant benefits in return: approval for advanced U.S. arms sales, official U.S. recognition of their territorial claims, and investments from the Abraham Fund—established by the U.S., Israel, and the UAE—to promote regional economic cooperation with the Jewish state. It is expected that countries joining this “club” during the upcoming expansion of the accords will receive similar, if not greater, dividends. It is absurd that Muslim countries that only recently recognized Israel stand to gain substantial benefits from establishing diplomatic ties, while Azerbaijan—one of the pillars of Israel’s regional security for over two decades—not only receives nothing in return but remains subject to U.S. sanctions under Section 907.

4. Azerbaijan’s unique conceptual and practical experience in Muslim-Jewish cooperation can be leveraged to expand the Abraham Accords to Muslim countries in the Middle East, Asia, and Africa. Several senior officials from Azerbaijan’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Ministry of Economy have been actively engaged in bilateral relations with Israel for years and could serve as consultants for The Friedman Center for Peace Through Strength and The Abraham Fund as the accords expand. Building on Azerbaijan’s experience—and with the participation of Israel, the U.S., Azerbaijan, and other Muslim nations—new regional development projects can be launched in energy, agriculture, and healthcare. A crucial factor in this context is that the UAE, one of the architects and key participants in the Abraham Accords, is also Azerbaijan’s top partner in the Arab world (both in investment volume and frequency of high-level state visits in 2023-2024). This Azerbaijani-Emirati partnership can serve as an expert and conceptual foundation for expanding the Abraham Accords, while also providing a practical model for multilateral regional cooperation involving Israel and the U.S.

5. Israel and pro-Israel forces in the U.S. should actively advocate for Azerbaijan’s inclusion in American-Israeli regional development, investment, and technology partnerships. Israel is already advancing a trilateral partnership model for Morocco, involving American companies, and plans to extend this approach to Sunni Gulf monarchies and the U.S. in defense, AI, and cybersecurity as part of the Abraham Accords expansion. Azerbaijan’s participation in such initiatives would strengthen the Muslim component of Israel’s regional partnerships. Moreover, this fully aligns with the Trump administration’s strategy of expanding multilateral cooperation among U.S. allies to reduce Washington’s financial burden on regional development and defense projects.

6. President Trump has clearly outlined his intentions for the full-scale reconstruction of the Gaza Strip. On February 9, he stated that certain Middle Eastern and other countries might participate in the effort. Despite protests in the Muslim world, the American leader appears determined to follow through with his declared plans. If Washington ultimately manages to reach an agreement with key moderate Arab leaders regarding their participation—one way or another—in Gaza’s reconstruction, the U.S. will likely seek to involve additional Muslim countries in the project. However, if the proposed plan is adjusted to accommodate the positions of Riyadh, Cairo, and Amman, then the reconstruction—which is necessary in any case—will most likely involve the UAE, Egypt, and possibly other Arab states. In any scenario, Washington may turn to Baku with a proposal to participate on a humanitarian basis, acting as a free supplier of energy resources needed for reconstruction efforts and for the needs of the Palestinian population during the project’s active phase. Of course, Azerbaijan’s involvement would only be considered if at least several other Muslim countries also take part.

7. Between 2007 and 2024, Azerbaijan, through the Heydar Aliyev Foundation, sponsored the restoration of at least two dozen world-renowned cultural and historical monuments and religious sites in France, Germany, Italy, Bulgaria, and the Vatican. For example, the foundation contributed to the restoration of the Notre-Dame Church in Strasbourg, the Basilica of Saint Paul, and the Catacombs of Saints Marcellinus and Peter in the Vatican. Despite Azerbaijan investing millions of dollars in these projects, European countries have not publicly highlighted its role in preserving key symbols of Christian civilization. Meanwhile, in the Middle East and North Africa, there are numerous historical sites revered in Islamic, Jewish, and Christian traditions, as well as 26 Jewish and Christian sites in Iraq, Syria, and Lebanon, some of which are in a state of partial ruin. In this context, an initiative could be proposed—aligned with the spirit of the Abraham Accords—to establish a joint fund with the participation of Azerbaijan, the UAE, and ideally Turkey (which, notably, has shown particular care at the state level in preserving religious sites of all three faiths). This fund could take on the role of restoring, preserving, and promoting these monuments internationally. Such an initiative would be especially relevant for countries in the region that have been affected by military conflicts in recent years. The project would benefit all three major monotheistic religions, as well as the states where these historical sites are located. In the long run, it could lay the groundwork for an international interfaith tourism program, which in turn could become a key avenue for the broader development of the Middle Eastern region.

The considerations presented here are advisory in nature. They can be further refined and adapted to specific projects and initiatives. Our goal was to provide a set of practical ideas that can now be utilized by consultants and officials in Israel, the U.S., and Azerbaijan who are interested in enhancing the Israel-Azerbaijan partnership and expanding their cooperation. By leveraging this experience, they can contribute to Israel’s deeper integration into the Greater Middle East and to the strengthening of regional stability.

Capt. (res.) Alexander Grinberg, Former IDF Military Intelligence & Research Fellowship, Expert on Iran in IDF Military Intelligence