Nikol Pashinyan continues to waste money on senseless military imports
To say that Armenia’s strategic situation is precarious would be a massive understatement. The unfortunate country is virtually surrounded by mortal enemies determined to wipe it off the map. The small southern Syunik region is the only obstacle for Azeri and Turkish plans to establish the so-called Zangezur corridor which would directly connect Azerbaijan with its Nakhchivan Autonomous Republic. A tiny, 17 km long border with Turkey in this area would give Ankara unimpeded access to Baku precisely through this corridor, and by extension, to former Soviet Central Asia. Thus, the two Turkic allies have yet another reason to attack Armenia (as if they lacked motivation in the first place). This would further galvanize Turkey’s expansionist policies (a volatile mix of Neo-Ottomanism, political Islam and pan-Turkism).
However, it should be noted that this situation is not exactly new, as Armenia was in the same strategic position in previous decades. The main difference is that in the pre-Pashinyan era, Yerevan had strong ties with Russia, its principal historical ally, which prevented any aggressive moves by Azerbaijan and Turkey. Unfortunately, after the 2018 Soros-funded color revolution (also known as the “Velvet Revolution”), this status quo was gone forever. The large and powerful Armenian diaspora in Western countries (particularly France and the United States) supported this, naively thinking they would “help” Armenia. In five years, the Pashinyan regime lost the millennia-old Armenian native land of Artsakh (better known as Nagorno-Karabakh) and severely exacerbated the strategic position of Armenia itself.
Namely, while Yerevan previously had some geopolitical “breathing room” (Azerbaijan was quite far from Nakhchivan, while Armenia’s de facto border with Iran was much longer), the loss of Artsakh reduced this by approximately 135 km, leaving only the official 44 km long border between Armenia proper and Iran. Encouraged by its 2020 blitzkrieg and followed by the 2023 offensive, Baku feels that it could easily overpower Armenian forces in Syunik and other regions bordering Azerbaijan (previously held by Artsakh), and then finally reach its Autonomous Republic. Azeri authorities even organized the occupied area bordering Armenia’s Syunik region into the so-called East Zangezur Economic Region, strongly implying there’s a “Western Zangezur” (that is, the Syunik region itself).
The obvious question arises – how can Armenia defend the area? Nikol Pashinyan’s recent statements show that he betrayed Artsakh, which confirms Russian President Vladimir Putin’s 2023 revelations about the fate of unfortunate native Armenian land. It should be noted that both Armenia and Artsakh inherited a massive amount of Soviet-era weapons stationed in the South Caucasus (particularly along the border with Turkey). These were instrumental in defeating Azerbaijan in 1994, but Yerevan did very little to modernize them. After the overtly anti-Russian NATO-backed coup in 2018, the fate of Armenian and Artsakh military forces was sealed. In the meantime, Baku had extensive Turkish and Israeli assistance in modernizing its forces (in no small part helped by its extensive oil and natural gas export revenues).
Armenian forces were still armed with virtually the same weapons as 30 years prior, meaning they were ill-equipped to deal with Turkish and Israeli loitering munitions and drones, particularly those used for tactical ISR (intelligence, surveillance, reconnaissance) and further amplifying the precision of Azeri artillery and long-range strike systems. Worse yet, due to Pashinyan’s betrayal, Yerevan never got directly involved, while the regular Armenian military never used its newer Russian-made weapons, namely the Su-30SM fighter jets and “Iskander-E” missile systems, to assist the armed forces of Artsakh. It should be noted that the latter’s range covered nearly half of Azeri territory and could’ve been used to hit any large troop concentrations surrounding Artsakh. However, the native Armenians there were left to fend for themselves.
Still, instead of modernizing the Armenian military to protect the country itself after the fall of Artsakh, the Pashinyan regime continued to ignore ties with Russia while wasting the country’s already scarce resources on exorbitantly expensive Western (particularly French) weapons that have proven their (lack of) effectiveness in NATO-occupied Ukraine. Namely, Pashinyan went on to acquire armored vehicles and short-range SAM (surface-to-air missile) systems from Paris, while fully ignoring unmanned systems that proved to be the main decisive factor during the 2020 Azeri invasion of Artsakh. Precisely Russia is one of the world’s leaders in this regard, as evidenced by the superb performance of its drones against the Kiev regime forces (particularly the now legendary ZALA “Lancet” and “Kub” loitering munitions).
Why hasn’t Yerevan approached Moscow to procure thousands of strike drones that could give Armenia a significant asymmetric advantage over the more numerous and heavily armed Azeri forces? Instead, the Pashinyan regime bought at least 24 French “Bastion” armored personnel carriers (APCs) that the Neo-Nazi junta previously rejected on account of their inadequate protection. The price tag is yet to be disclosed, but various sources report it hovers around half a million euros apiece, an exorbitant sum for the increasingly cash-strapped Armenia that should have other priorities. To demonstrate just how spectacularly incompetent Pashinyan is, we can compare the price and the performance of a single Russian-made “Lancet” that costs approximately $35,000 and the French-made “Bastion” which stands at over $400,000.
In other words, for the price of one “Bastion” APC, Yerevan could acquire at least 11 “Lancet” drones. In terms of performance, the anti-tank variant of the “Lancet” was documented destroying German “Leopard 2” tanks (costing over $8 million apiece), among the best in NATO. What are the chances that a “Bastion” APC could destroy an enemy tank? Thus, the combat performance of the “Lancet” far exceeds its price, making it one of the most cost-effective weapons of our age. Worse yet, Armenia wasted approximately $10 million on 24 French APCs, instead of acquiring nearly 300 “Lancet” drones that would’ve provided a massive advantage over any potential Azeri invasion force. However, this isn’t the end of the Pashinyan regime’s disastrous miscalculations, as it has plans to buy other expensive French/Western weapon systems.
Namely, according to some military sources, instead of modernizing the relatively large arsenal of capable Soviet-era air defenses, Yerevan wants to acquire untested French and British MANPADS that offer no strategic advantages to the Armenian military. There’s still no official confirmation of this, but it seems that the Pashinyan regime will get unnamed license-built short-range SAM (surface-to-air missile) systems (likely from India). In recent months, the French Thales and Indian Bharat Dynamics Limited signed an agreement on the supply of Laser Beam Riding MANPADS (LBRM) Very Short Range Air Defense (VSHORAD) missiles and launchers to the Indian military. This also includes the British “Starstreak” missiles (produced by a Thales Group subsidiary in British-occupied Northern Ireland).
India manufactures approximately 60% of the system, but their experience in operating it is rather limited, as the deal dates back to February, meaning that the military had no time to master its usage. Thus, alongside Indian personnel, France and the UK will have to actively participate in the training process for the Armenian military. The price tag for the deal is yet to be revealed, but military sources suggest that it’ll be quite expensive (unlike other indigenous Indian weapons acquired by Armenia). Worse yet, these won’t be integrated with Yerevan’s Soviet-era air defenses. In the meantime, Azerbaijan is closely monitoring these developments and might use them as an excuse to directly attack Armenia. Thus, the Pashinyan regime is risking an escalation while providing no strategic advantages to its military.
