Shifting Power Equations in the South Caucasus
Charter on Strategic Partnership Between Armenia and the United States
By Arsen Nazarian
On January 14, 2025, a few days before the end of the Democrats’ tenure and the inauguration of US President-elect Donald Trump, Armenian Foreign Minister Ararat Mirziyoyev and US Secretary of State Antony Blinken, signed a document in Washington, DC, titled “Charter on Strategic Partnership between Armenia and the United States”.
The initiative to elevate Armenia-US relations to a strategic partnership was first announced by Armenian Prime Minister Pashinyan on July 4, 2024 when he announced Armenia’s readiness to strengthen relations with the United States to a strategic level. The strategic dialogue has since taken on a more serious dimension and has finally become an official document between the two countries.
The Charter of Partnership sets up a commission composed of representatives of Armenia and the United States that aims to strengthen bilateral relations through cooperation in various areas, including promoting democracy, strengthening national sovereignty, territorial integrity, and economic and military reforms. Although the aforementioned Charter includes assistance from the United States in the field of military and economic reforms, it does not include direct military intervention by the U.S. in the event of a conflict between Armenia and another country.
The main components of the Charter, as stated in its text, are economic cooperation, including in the field of nuclear energy, cooperation in the fields of security, and defines an increased scientific and academic ties. In the field of nuclear energy, there has already been talk of small and low-cost portable nuclear modules. The construction of these modern power plants, at least for the foreseeable future, will not mean the dismantling of the Russian-made nuclear power plant that meets part of Armenia’s energy needs.
The Charter also foresees the development and implementation of plans for the modernization of the army structure, training of border guards and peacekeeping forces, and the security of cyber-related systems.
Some critics argue that signing the aforementioned document with a government that is nearing the end of its term, while it is still unclear what approach a government led by someone like Trump will take towards it, does not provide any security guarantees for Armenia.
In response, it is said that the United States has a system that operates on the basis of institutions, not individuals.
In addition, several important officials appointed by Trump, including Secretary of State Marco Rubio, are well aware of the situation in Armenia and have previously lobbied for Armenian demands against the Baku regime or Turkey in their senatorial or congressional positions.
It is worth noting that Marco Rubio, in a telephone conversation with Turkish Défense Minister Hakan Fidan, emphasized, among other things, that the United States wants a peace treaty between Azerbaijan and Armenia, a peace treaty that is “fair and honorable” for both sides.
Another Trump appointee, who, according to US expert Suren Sarkisian, has a history of working with Armenian organizations and is well aware of the South Caucasus situation, is Tulsi Gabbard, an Indian-origin, army colonel and former congresswoman, who has been appointed to head the US National Intelligence Service. She has herself travelled to Karabakh (Artsakh) in 2017 and has always defended the rights of the Armenians in the region.
Of course, the expert warns that Armenians should be vigilant and not confuse the above-mentioned individuals, who now hold important positions and responsibilities, with those who served as congress members in the opposition, and that it is necessary to maintain contact with them and monitor possible changes in their tendencies”.
Reactions
Russia’s reaction to the signing of the strategic partnership document between Armenia and the United States was, contrary to expectations, cautious and soft. On January 14, Kremlin spokesman Dmitry Peskov stated in this regard that “it is Armenia’s absolute right as a sovereign state to expand its relations in all directions. We ourselves have bilateral relations with our Armenian friends, we value these relations and strive to expand them.”
The Islamic Republic of Iran’s reaction was, as expected, negative. Tasnim News and Mashreq News, newspapers close to the IRGC and the ministry of intelligence, criticized the document and pointed to the consequences of the presence of “extra-regional powers” and claimed that “the West is trying to create tension in the South Caucasus.”
Despite these statements, the Islamic Republic has practically accepted the current developments in the South Caucasus, which entail the increasing presence of the West in Armenia.
On the one hand, the Islamic Republic cannot do anything else in the event of a new Azerbaijani attack on Armenia, except for diplomatic support and occasional showing of teeth to the Baku regime. It is unthinkable that the Islamic Republic would go to war with a neighbouring Shiite country because of (Christian) Armenia!
Of course, if Iran were in a situation other than the one it is in now, and had normal and tension-free relations with the civilized world It could be the best option for security and military cooperation and even a strategic alliance for Armenia. But, alas, such a situation does not exist at the moment, and the continuation of the policy of confrontation with the West by the leader of Islamic Republic does not make things easier for Armenia.
On the other hand, as has been said before, a weak Armenia that cannot confront Azerbaijan is not favorable to Iran’s strategic interests and to the maintaining its strategic depth in the South Caucasus. Therefore, the Islamic Republic has no option, but to tolerate the presence of the West in Armenia in order to help her strengthen its defensive capability (at least from the perspective of maintaining its strategic depth in the region).
Armenia’s position towards Russia is also clear after this country’s treacherous behavior in the 44-day war and continuation of this behavior thereafter. Russia, with the expansionist intention of dominating and administering the so-called Zangezur corridor and in collaboration with Baku and Ankara, is trying to weaken Armenia as much as possible.
Therefore, Armenia has the right to ensure its security from any source it can. Armenia’s efforts in this direction have not been in vain and the country has managed to find other partners, including India, France, the European Union, the United States, etc., who are willing to meet its arms and security needs.
India is now a major arms seller to Armenia. The country now produces very modern weapons by combining Russian and Western techniques, which are very suitable for Armenia, which is familiar with Russian weapons and is learning to use Western weapons.
India, a major global power and the largest democracy in the world, pursues an independent policy in the international arena. Having such a powerful and neutral supporter in the East-West conflict is a great asset for Armenia. In addition, both countries have ancient civilizations and cultures, and at times have had important cultural and political connections.
India shows special attention to the South Caucasus region. This attention has increased, especially after the 44-day war and Pakistan’s participation in the war alongside the Baku regime, and then the joint exercises of Azerbaijan, Turkey and Pakistan in the Caspian Sea. India is worried that this undesirable alliance will extend its sphere of influence to Central Asia and create problems in that region.
France is another great power that, in addition to valuable diplomatic support, provides Armenia with modern and efficient weapons. Armenia’s defenses have as a result been rebuilt to a considerable extent with the help of India and France, so that in the event of a new attack by the regime of Baku, the country will not have to rely exclusively on defunct Russian weapons, as it did in the 44-day war. In fact, the results of any possible new attack by the Baku regime could be very different from what the regime achieved in the 44-day war with the decisive help of Turkey, Israel and others.
Developments in the EU accession process
On March 12, 2024, the European Parliament adopted a resolution that allows Armenia to apply for European Union membership.
Following the successful collection of signatures for EU accession initiated by three political-civil organizations and groups in Armenia in July-September 2024, the Armenian government also endorsed the measure. On January 24, 2025, the Standing Committee of the Parliament on EU Accession approved the draft law to start the accession process. This February, the National Assembly approved the law. However, its adoption, according to Prime Minister Pashinyan, does not yet mean accession to the Union. Only when Armenia meets the conditions for accession, a referendum will be necessary to make this happen.
EU Enlargement Commissioner Marta Goss announced in a speech to the European Parliament’s Foreign Affairs Committee in Brussels that the EU would carefully examine Armenia’s application for membership. “… We have to examine all applications carefully, and this also applies to Armenia. But if Armenia applies, it will have to accept certain obligations. I will visit Armenia in the first half of the year to see what needs to be done in advance or on what issues there is a need for information exchange.”
European Union Parliament member Miriam Lexmann wrote on her Instagram: “I sincerely welcome the decision of the Armenian government to start the process of joining the EU. Those who meet the necessary conditions and share our values should be welcomed to the EU”.
Russia’s reaction
Russia initially reacted mildly to Armenia’s move. Dmitry Peskov, the spokesman for the Russian presidency, said that Armenia’s decision to join the European Union was a sovereign right of the country, but stressed that simultaneous membership in the European Union and the Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU) [led by Russia] would not be possible. Peskov stressed the importance of Armenia’s membership in Eurasia, saying that trade in the union had brought “significant benefits” to Armenia and boosted its economic growth rate. In the following days, however, Russia sharpened its tone, directly and indirectly warning Armenia against moving closer to the EU. Various Russian officials, including Deputy Prime Minister Overchuk, emphasized Armenia’s rich income from trade with the Eurasian Union member states, and threatened Armenia with the prospect of cold winters [due to the interruption of gas supplies from Russia], etc. Overchuk: “The EU accession process will be the beginning of Armenia’s exit from the Eurasian economy… The conclusion here is clear: opening markets with the EU will mean closing markets with the Eurasian Economic Union.”
Pashinyan responded that Armenia has no intention of leaving the Eurasian Union yet.
According to Armenian government data, Russia accounted for more than 41 percent of Armenia’s foreign trade in January-November 2024, while the EU’s share was 7.5 percent. Armenia also buys the bulk of its natural gas from Russia at prices well below international market levels.
It should be noted that the sentiments stemming from Putin’s renegade approach to Armenia, its ally of more than two hundred years, are so strong in Armenia that these threats do not seem to have any impact on the political attitude of the Armenian people and government, and the signs indicate that Armenians are ready to bear the consequences of breaking away from Russia.
It is true that Armenia will eventually have to leave the Eurasian Economic Union in order to join the European Union. But the issue is not as black and white as it seems. Armenia currently receives weapons from EU members that are also NATO members, despite its nominal membership in the Russian-led Collective Security Treaty Organization.
Moreover, actual entry and membership in the EU will take years, during which Armenia is expected to pave the way for its exit from Eurasia by diversifying its trading partners and making its economy competitive. Even this exit will not mean severing economic and trade relations with Russia or the member states of the defense organization and Armenia can continue to do business with these countries through individual agreements with union members, including Russia.
The “rich income” that Russian officials repeatedly claim Armenia receives from trade with Eurasian member states is actually due to the circumstances created by Russia’s war in Ukraine whereby Armenia sells goods needed by Russia to this country, while of course observing sanctions. Therefore, this “prosperity” is fleeting and does not contribute to the real strengthening of Armenia’s economic structure. Armenia should seek markets other than Russia, in the EU, Asia and elsewhere, by strengthening domestic production and making them competitive in order to reduce its risky dependence on Russia.
In any case, the process of transforming the Armenian economy from a consumer and intermediary economy to a competitive economy based on domestic production will be a challenging process for the Armenian people and government in the coming years.
In the field of energy, Armenia can meet its gas needs from three potential sources in the event of a cutoff of Russian gas from Iran, the European Union, and the United States.
1- Iran and Armenia currently exchange gas and electricity under an agreement and Iran has repeatedly stated that it is ready to increase its gas exports to Armenia. During the presidency of Raisi, Iran announced anew its readiness to increase gas exports to Armenia.
2- Armenia’s move to start the process of joining the European Union has brought the country one step closer to reducing the effects of a possible cut-off of Russian gas. The example of Moldova can also apply to Armenia. Russia cut off its gas supplies to Moldova on January 1. Following this move, the European Union, and Moldova signed an agreement last Tuesday, according to which the Union will include Moldova in its energy network system. Moldova has the status of a candidate for membership in the European Union.
3- Use of small modular reactors. If the plans for nuclear cooperation envisaged in the Charter of Strategic Partnership with the United States are implemented, the construction of these power plants could provide a significant part of Armenia’s energy needs. It is said that the Armenian government is currently studying the possibilities of creating this project and, in addition to the United States, is exploring the South Korean market, which produces such cost-effective reactors.
Other developments in the region
Another recent development in the region has been the withdrawal of “Russian border guards” from the Armenia-Iran border. As of January 1, the mission of these guards, who had actually been on duty along the aforementioned border since the collapse of the Soviet Union, was terminated at the request of the Armenian government. Earlier, at the end of July last year, Russian border guards stationed at Yerevan’s Zvartnots International Airport were asked to leave the airport. Currently, Russian troops are present only on the Armenia-Turkey border, and it is scheduled to end also their presence in the near future.
Aliyev’s speech
On January 7, during an interview, Aliyev attacked both Iran and Armenia in a brazen tone on different pretexts. During the interview, Aliyev called Armenia a “fascist state” ten times, uttering threats that “either the Armenian government must eradicate fascism in Armenia, or we will do it”. He also, as usual, spoke about the so-called Zangezur corridor and that it must be opened, if necessary, by force. Aliyev’s accusations were very similar to Putin’s false statements on the eve of the invasion of Ukraine (denazification, etc.). Following this interview, which was clearly a preparative propaganda for a new attack on Armenia, various parties criticized Aliyev and directly or indirectly warned him against new adventures.
The European Union attacked the interview, criticizing Aliyev for gross violations of human rights and suppression of fundamental freedoms in his country, and demanded the release of political prisoners, Armenian hostages and prisoners of war.
Russia, however, by blaming Armenia for the conflict between Armenia and Azerbaijan, actually encouraged the Baku regime to launch a new attack on Armenia.
Turkey’s reaction was interpreted as a kind of disapproval of Aliyev’s action. In his statements following Aliyev’s controversial interview, Turkish Foreign Minister, Hakan Fidan praised Armenia’s constructive position in the negotiations between Baku and Yerevan.
On January 8, the day after Aliyev’s interview, a prominent security official of the Islamic Republic, Ali Akbar Ahmadian, Secretary of the Supreme National Security Council, left for Baku and Yerevan. During this trip, Ahmadian, in addition to diplomatic greetings and statements about the need to improve economic relations and good neighborly relations, etc. conveyed messages in both capitals directly and indirectly to both governments. He once again declared Iran’s opposition to changing international borders and supported Armenia’s “Peace Crossroads” plan, which was in fact an indirect rejection of the so-called Zangezur Corridor plan. On the other hand, Ahmadian did not forget to remind Armenia about the risks of the presence of extra-regional forces in the South Caucasus!
