THE SEEDS OF FUTURE CONFLICT BETWEEN ARMENIA AND AZERBAIJAN

By David L. Phillips

The government of Azerbaijan heralds a peace agreement normalizing relations with Armenia. But the
deal is so one-sided it won’t create conditions for sustainable peace. By enshrining victor’s justice, the
deal sows the seeds for resentment and future hostilities between the two Caucasus countries who have
fought two bloody wars since 1992 and remain at odds over a number of unresolved issues.
Azerbaijan seized Nagorno-Karabakh, called “Artsakh” by Armenians, in a lightning military operation in
September 2023. Up to 120,000 Armenians fled to Armenia abandoning their properties and churches to
Azerbaijan’s armed forces. Displaced and demoralized, refugees from Artsakh have been resettled in
deplorable conditions.
The Government of Armenia had no choice but to acquiesce to Azerbaijan’s demands. Prime Minister
Nikol Pashinyan had a gun to his head in negotiations with Azerbaijan’s President Ilham Aliev.
The agreement eliminates the Organization for Security Cooperation in Europe whose Minsk Group
spent decades trying to mediate between the Caucasus countries. They fought to draw in the 1990s.
However, Azerbaijan spent its oil wealth on missiles and other sophisticated weapons giving it a decided
advantage. Turkey’s material and logistical assistance also tilted the battlefield.
The agreement disallows armed forces from third countries on the border. The European Union
Monitoring Mission played a critical role preventing the escalation of conflict until 2023 when
Azerbaijani forces invaded. The ban on foreign forces covers Russian border guards who policed parts of
Armenia's frontiers.
Moscow pledged to guarantee implementation of the 2022 agreement that established short-lived
peace between the Caucasus countries. Russia was ineffective at best – duplicitous at worst.
The deal also requires that Amenia abandon its legal claims at the International Court of Justice alleging
Azerbaijan committed ethic cleaning and genocide, a touchy issue for Armenians who were victims of
Turkey’s genocide in the early twentieth century when 1.5 million people were exiled and murdered.
Azerbaijan also demands that Armenia’s constitution “eliminate the claims against the sovereignty and
territorial integrity of Azerbaijan.” In fact. Azerbaijan has made claims against Armenia’s sovereignty.
Azerbaijan insists that Armenia’s roads be opened to establish a link between the Azerbaijan enclave of
Nakhichevan and Armenian territory. The strategic Zangezur corridor is under Azeri control.
Azerbaijan insists that Armenia replace its founding document. The Pashinyan government insists on a
public referendum before amending its charter.
The recent agreement is silent on the status of Armenians who are being held as prisoners of war in
Azerbaijan. There is no provision for releasing them or arrangement for the International Committee of
the Red Cross to monitor conditions of their detention.
No provision in the agreement exists for the return of displaced people to Karabakh or the protection of
Armenians churches and cultural monuments.

The agreement is silent on compensation for Armenians whose properties were destroyed by invading
Azerbaijani forces. No date has been set for an actual signing ceremony. It is unlikely that the agreement
will actually be formalized.
History is instructive. The Versailles Treaty of 1918, which ended the First World War, was a flawed
agreement. It demanded that Germany pay onerous reparations and thereby set the stage for future
conflict. Punitive peace agreements may temporarily stop a war, but risk sowing the seeds for future
conflict. Active hostilities between Armenia and Azerbaijan may be in remission, but conflict will
resurface unless Armenians are treated fairly, and reconciliation takes root between the people from
both countries.
David L. Phillips is an adjunct professor at Georgetown University’s Security Studies Program specializing
in the South Caucasus. He served as chairman of the Turkey-Amenia Reconciliation Commission and led
the Program on Track Two Activities in the South Caucasus.