Turkey eyes post-Iran Middle East as regional order shifts – analysis
It’s not clear whether Ankara is posing as a neutral power or seeking to portray itself as similar to most European and NATO powers that also remained outside the war.
Turkey has sought to remain outside the Iran conflict. It’s not clear whether Ankara is posing as neutral or seeking to portray itself as similar to most European and NATO powers, who also remained outside the war.
In any case, it has not come in for criticism from the White House. This is in contrast to European countries, as well as Oman, which has been critiqued. Ankara is also not stepping up to play the mediation role that Pakistan and Qatar have sought.
As such, Turkey is in a unique position, though this isn’t new for Ankara, which has often set its own, independent policies. Even though Turkey is a member of NATO, it has remained outside major world conflicts since the end of World War I.
It should be recalled that the Ottoman Empire entered that war on the side of Germany and Austria-Hungary. Among the initiatives that convinced the “Sublime Porte” to enter the war was the dispatch of the German warships Breslau and Goeben to Turkey, replacing ships that the Turks had ordered from Britain. Ankara then joined what was to become the losing side in the war, which led to the collapse of the empire and the emergence of modern Turkey.
Possibly due to this, modern Turkish nationalism has often sought to remain outside of major conflicts. It was able to avoid World War II. During the Cold War, Turkey became a member of NATO and a friend of the United States and the West. However, Turkey remained concerned about the direction of the Global War on Terror after 9/11, wary of the US’s 2003 invasion of Iraq.
Since then, Turkey has been ruled by the Adalet ve Kalkinma Partisi (AKP) – Justice and Development Party – with Islamic and conservative roots and linked to the Muslim Brotherhood.
This is in contrast to the secular nationalist Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi (CHP) – Republican People’s Party – that led Turkey for much of the 80 years from 1923 to 2003.
In recent years, Turkey has become slightly less aggressive abroad. It still has its interests in Syria and Libya and the Eastern Mediterranean, as well as a global posture that sees Ankara as a link between the Islamic and Turkish worlds. However, it views the changing world order and the attempts to exploit the power vacuum with apprehension.Turkey seeks ties to US as Trump administration zig-zags
Turkey’s leader has sought to cultivate close ties with the Trump administration, though it can also see how the White House sometimes zig-zags on policy.
In 2025, the US administration was seeking to end the Israel-Hamas War and achieve peace deals. However, in 2026, it has become more interventionist, notably with the Iran war, as well as very critical of some of its traditional allies. The US is also very close to Israel, and Ankara is likely wary of this.
Some articles have appeared in pro-Israel circles suggesting that Turkey is the “next” Iran. This has raised eyebrows in Ankara, which appears to fear that Israel is seeking regional hegemony. As a NATO power with a large defense industrial base, Turkey can imagine a potential clash.
How might the clash develop? It could develop over tensions in the Eastern Mediterranean. It could be in Syria. Ankara is aware of the realpolitik that leads regional powers to clash, and thus, it has sought to improve ties with Saudi Arabia and the Sunnis. This development has led to more concerns in Jerusalem that this Sunni bloc of countries might replace the Iranian-backed proxies or “Shia crescent.”
This is where Turkey is treading more carefully. Rather than bashing Israel – as Ankara did in 2024 – using the Israel-Hamas War as an excuse, Turkey’s politicians are taking more of a “wait and see” approach.
Ankara’s crackdown on domestic opposition is not new. The AKP has long sought to remove what it claims is a “deep state” via mass arrests of the opposition. It has targeted Kurdish left-wing political groups, students, European-linked NGOs, and also now the CHP. The latest target is Ozgur Ozel, leader of the CHP.
“Turkey is emerging as a long-term winner from the US-Israeli war against Iran, which has provided Recep Tayyip Erdogan, the Turkish president, room to accelerate an anti-democratic backslide with no global repercussions,” The Telegraph says.
“Not only has he seized the moment to stage a crackdown on his opposition while the world’s gaze was averted, but he has also managed to boost Turkey’s standing on the global stage.”
US ambassador to Turkey may play role in US Iraq policy
There are many issues now for Turkey. Ankara is working on a potential deal with the Partiya Karkeren Kurdistane (PKK) – the Kurdistan Workers’ Party – which would see that party dissolved.
It is also working on a deal with Armenia. It is balancing its support for Ukraine while also working with Russia. Ankara is also seeking to help Syria emerge as a strong state.
The US ambassador to Turkey, Tom Barrack, was also the US envoy to Syria until that term expired recently. It appears that Barrack may play a role in US policy in Iraq. This would please Turkey as well. However, there are many critics of Barrack, including supporters of the Kurds in Syria and others.
“Erdogan has led Turkey for nearly a quarter of a century, consolidating power at home, particularly in the periods immediately following political challenges – mass protests in 2013, and a military coup in 2016, both of which were halted by the authorities with deadly force,” The Telegraph notes.
“More recently, major demonstrations erupted in March 2025 after Mr. Erdogan’s main political challenger, Ekrem Imamoglu, the mayor of Istanbul, was arrested. Under Mr Erdogan, Turkey – which boasts NATO’s second-largest military after the US – has become the world’s 11th largest arms exporter, particularly of drones, which have been shipped to numerous countries, from Ukraine to Libya.”
What comes next with the Iran conflict is not clear. Ankara is waiting to see what happens. US pressure on the Gulf countries and Turkey to join the Abraham Accords has certainly raised eyebrows in Ankara. Turkey has always said it could dial down rhetoric regarding Israel if the Gaza war ended and Israel moved to accept a two-state concept. This is also Saudi Arabia’s view. Israel’s current coalition government will never make this move. However, Turkey is willing to wait and see what elections may bring in Jerusalem.
Turkey will also have elections, and the opposition could perform well. Nothing lasts forever, and the current policies of Jerusalem and Ankara may both change. The Iran war, therefore, may play out differently than expected.
