When and how Father Aliyev agreed to “lower the bar”

- Azatutyun.am
New details from the Karabakh settlement talks
While the Armenian Prime Minister claims that since the ceasefire was established in 1994, negotiations on the Karabakh issue have been focused solely on returning Artsakh to Azerbaijan, documents from the United States State Department that became available years ago show that the Armenian side demanded independence, and at least in 1997, under pressure from the Minsk Group co-chairs, Father Aliyev agreed in Washington to a phased settlement option, under which Armenian forces were to be withdrawn from six regions adjacent to Karabakh, a buffer zone with multinational peacekeeping forces was to be created between the parties, and the region’s roads and railways were to be opened. After that, in the second phase, the status of Nagorno-Karabakh was to be determined, which was linked to the withdrawal of Armenian forces from Lachin and Shushi. Aliyev even said that he was ready for direct negotiations not only with Armenia, but also with representatives of Nagorno-Karabakh. This was written to his Minsk Group colleagues by US Deputy Secretary of State Strobe Talbot on August 7, 1997, after Heydar Aliyev’s visit to the United States ( see the document here ).
“He (Aliyev) confirmed both in open text and during private conversations Azerbaijan’s readiness to enter into direct negotiations with Armenia and Nagorno-Karabakh under the auspices of the Minsk Group.”
He publicly accepted the proposal of the Minsk Group co-chairs as the basis for negotiations.
This was Heydar Aliyev’s first official visit to the United States, during which he signed the first contracts with American oil giants Exxon, Mobil, and Chevron. “I am grateful for this historic opportunity,” he told the US president behind closed doors, according to a declassified White House document. Clinton, in turn, hinted that they expected the Azerbaijani president to make a positive statement on the Karabakh issue and his readiness for direct negotiations. It was there that Aliyev told Clinton that he was ready to go for a settlement according to the proposal presented by the Minsk Group ( see the document here ).
“This proposal consists of two stages. The first involves the withdrawal of Armenian forces from six regions, and the return of refugees to those regions. The second stage will determine the status of Nagorno-Karabakh, after which the remaining two regions will be liberated. If we achieve a solution to the first stage and guarantee the withdrawal of Armenian forces and the return of refugees, this will accelerate the resolution of other issues. I am ready to announce this today. As for direct negotiations, Azerbaijan, Armenia and Nagorno-Karabakh are represented in the Minsk Group process. We will continue that, and I am ready to make a statement on that.”

“The first phase is planned as follows: lands are liberated, and OSCE peacekeeping forces are deployed to guarantee this. The status of Nagorno-Karabakh can be determined in the second phase, along with the issues of Lachin and Shusha. Nagorno-Karabakh’s main concern is its connection with Armenia. This road that you see on the map leads from Nagorno-Karabakh to Armenia. We have repeatedly stated that we are not against Nagorno-Karabakh having a communication corridor connecting it with Armenia through the Lachin territory. This vein should be under the control of OSCE peacekeeping forces.”

“Yesterday, for the first time, President Aliyev revealed the fundamental principles of the peace plan presented by the Minsk Group. The first part envisages the withdrawal of Armenian armed units from the six occupied regions of Azerbaijan and the return of refugees to those territories. The second part includes the issue of the status of Karabakh, the liberation of Lachin and Shushi, and the return of refugees.”
Speaking about the status, Aliyev reaffirmed that he is ready to grant Nagorno-Karabakh the highest degree of autonomy ever known, but Armenia does not agree to this. Official Yerevan, at least according to declassified documents from those years, demanded independence for Karabakh, refusing to recognize the territorial integrity of Azerbaijan. There are numerous diplomatic cables about this. In 1996, for example, after a meeting with Aliyev in Baku, Deputy Secretary of State Strobe Talbot sent a diplomatic cable to Washington, telling ( see the document here ):
“When the journalists left, Aliyev raised the key issue for Azerbaijan: territorial integrity. Azerbaijan’s status as an independent state (and Aliyev’s ability to remain in power) requires that Armenia recognize Azerbaijan’s territorial integrity. Aliyev insisted that it was impossible to reach an agreement on the principles of a settlement of the Karabakh issue because Armenia did not want to recognize Azerbaijan’s territorial integrity.”
Aliyev’s advisor Vafa Guluzade also declassified details from his meetings with Zhirayr Liparityan, advisor to the Armenian president, and insisted that with each point of the negotiations, “Armenia aims to achieve de jure, not de facto, independence.”
Aliyev, for his part, insisted that he agreed to any form of autonomy, but not independence.
“We will never agree to that, the international community will not agree either, nor can we allow the creation of a second Armenian state on that territory.”
It was in order to bring these diametrically opposed positions of the parties closer together that the mediators proposed moving in stages: first, to eliminate the consequences of the war, establish diplomatic and trade relations, restore mutual trust, and then to determine the status of Karabakh. For a long time, Baku rejected this stage-by-stage option. However, a secret cable from Deputy Secretary of State Talbot testifies that the Azerbaijani leader agreed in Washington in 1997, which gave the mediators enormous grounds for optimism. “I have made a concession on my part, and Armenia must make its own,” Aliyev told Clinton during a meeting at the White House ( see the document here ).
“(Aliyev’s) visit confirmed, and perhaps even advanced, the progress we have made in the past few months. President Aliyev placed the resolution of the Karabakh conflict at the top of his Washington agenda, appreciating the efforts of the mediators to reach a solution,” Talbott informed the Russians and French.
What did Azerbaijan gain , and why did Heydar Aliyev agree to ” lower the bar”?
Coming to power in 1993, Heydar Aliyev inherited a country that, as he himself said, was 20 percent occupied, had more than a million refugees, and an economy that, according to the World Bank, was poorer than that of Armenia, which was in the midst of a blockade and energy crisis. After negotiations with Aliyev in Baku in 1996, the Deputy Secretary of State cabled Washington ( see the document here ):
“Aliyev said he wanted to emphasize one thing: he is personally convinced that now is the right time to go for peace. Azerbaijan needs lasting peace, like air and water.”

“In our country, the president cannot dictate his will to Congress, even if his party members form a majority in Congress. There is also a significant influence of Armenian Americans here. But I think Congress understands that we need to end subsection 907, and I think they will support my request to change it, even eliminate it, if, of course, the Karabakh issue is resolved.”
The other issue that, according to State Department documents, Aliyev repeatedly raised in meetings with the American side was his official visit to the United States.
The other two leaders of the Caucasus, Shevardnadze and Ter-Petrosyan, had already been to the White House, Aliyev had not yet, and he did not miss the opportunity to praise President Clinton in open and closed meetings, to demonstrate his ties with him. “Aliyev needs this not only for his internal, but also for his external audience,” Deputy Secretary of State Strobe Talbot cabled after meetings in Baku in 1996 ( see the document here ).
“During the dinner, Aliyev made a long toast to President Clinton. … For Aliyev, any communication with the President is essential, thereby strengthening his position in front of his own people, and he also wants to show the Russians and Iranians that he has connections that can counterbalance their (Russia’s and Iran’s) attempts to gain dominance in the region.”
Clinton, on whom Aliyev had high hopes, invited him to the White House in August 1997, and at the same time advised him to look to the future instead of focusing on the Karabakh issue: “In ten years, with oil development and pipelines, Azerbaijan will reach the world,” Clinton said in a closed-door conversation, the transcript of which was declassified by the White House ( see the document here ).
“It is important that when a country is on a big road, it is not pushed off that road because of a small stone. This (Karabakh) is a serious and emotional issue that is like a boulder today. But the advantages that Azerbaijan has in the future will make it become a small stone, and we want to help you in this.”

By agreeing to withdraw troops from six regions and leaving the issue of Karabakh’s status open to the future, what guarantee was there that Azerbaijan would ultimately agree to full independence for Karabakh? There is no such guarantee in the documents presented in 1997, published by Minsk Group Co-Chair Vladimir Kazimirov, as well as in the cables declassified by the State Department. On the other hand, there is also no predetermination in the phased approach that Karabakh must necessarily be part of Azerbaijan. While promising neither full independence nor territorial integrity, the mediators instead stipulated clear guarantees of security and self-government. In a 1997 interview, Aliyev clearly stated ( see the document here ):
“After the liberation of these regions, peacekeepers will be deployed on the borders of Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Nagorno-Karabakh. Then, in the second stage, the issue of Shushi and Lachin will be resolved. Aliyev said that the Lachin corridor is key to the conflict, Azerbaijan can authorize that corridor to be under the control of international forces only .”
After the liberation of the occupied territories, a buffer zone was to be created between the parties, which was to be uninhabited, completely demilitarized; only peacekeepers were to be stationed here, and not from one country, but from several OSCE states. The multinational peacekeeping mission was to ensure that no heavy armored vehicles remained in the buffer and separation zones, and that military flights were stopped. In parallel with the withdrawal of forces, the parties were also to take immediate measures to open roads, railways, trade and other relations.
The first contracts for the construction of Azerbaijani pipelines in the region were being signed at that time, and Armenia could actually become part of that process.
“1997 will be a year of decisions on gas pipelines and transportation r
The same was repeated by US Deputy Secretary of State Strobe Talbot, who received Armenian Presidential Advisor Zhirayr Liparityan in Washington in September 1997. The content of this conversation has also been declassified by the US State Department ( see the document here).
“Talbot concluded the meeting by emphasizing the interest with
In parallel, as the same declassified documents testify, the Armenian side was trying to maintain the leverage or playing cards it had in its hands. One of the diplomatic documents from 1997, in particular, describes how Zhirayr Liparityan, an advisor to the first president of Armenia, negotiated for Washington to leave the restrictions against Azerbaijan in force until the parties reached an agreement ( see the document here ).
” The 907th subsection of foreign aid should remain u
Talbott, in response, emphasized that Aliyev had agreed to open communication channels during the American meetings. This was intended as a first stage of the settlement, without a final clarification of the status of Karabakh.
Why did the Minsk Group countries need this?
In parallel with the negotiations on the Karabakh issue, and especially after the defeat in the 44-day war, there is a persistent opinion that not all the countries of the Minsk Group have been, to put it mildly, honest and sincere in their mediation efforts. Even at the highest level, it was declared by official Yerevan that the Karabakh issue was used by external forces as a noose around Armenia’s neck. However, declassified documents by the State Department indicate that at least in the late 1990s, Presidents Clinton, Yeltsin, and Chirac were united and determined to resolve the issue. This issue was first raised by the US leader in March 1997 during a meeting with the Russian leader, the transcript of which was also declassified by the State Department ( see the document here ).
“Clinton said, ‘ I want to expand our coopera

” I agree , ” the US president responded, adding, ” We have finally moved the process forward . You , I , and Chirac must persevere .
Months after this conversation between the leaders of the superpowers, the US Deputy Secretary of State, a senior diplomat dealing with the Karabakh issue, Strobe Talbot, sent a confidential telegram to the Russian Deputy Foreign Minister, emphasizing ( see the document here ):
“Our greatest strength has bee

Against the backdrop of these intense negotiations, in November 1997, the first president of Armenia published the article “War or Peace?”, explaining that if the conflict is not resolved, Armenia and Karabakh will become incomparably weaker over the years. “What we reject today, we will ask for in the future, but we will not receive, as has happened many times in our history,” Levon Ter-Petrosyan wrote.
“It’s not about giving Karabak
“The path I have chosen will ensure that perspe

While the US Deputy Secretary of State, according to declassified State Department documents, was happily informing his colleagues that they had managed to convince and obtain Heydar Aliyev’s consent to this option, criticism in Yerevan was spreading from the opposition ranks to the upper echelons of power. In January 1998, when the issue was brought to the Security Council, Prime Minister Robert Kocharyan, Defense Minister Vazgen Sargsyan, Minister of Internal Affairs and National Security Serzh Sargsyan, Karabakh President Arkady Ghukasyan, and the heads of the Artsakh parliament and government spoke out against it. Vazgen Sargsyan, for example, insisted that the claims about Armenia’s isolation were false, that Russia and Iran would help if necessary, and Robert Kocharyan that the country and the economy could be developed even under blockade.
“Today , we are perhaps losing the last opportunity for a favorable resolution of the Karabakh issue and the prosperity of Armenia . And for that , we will all answer to our pe

The State Department, meanwhile, regularly declassifies its archived documents and diplomatic cables under the Freedom of Information Act, which gives U.S. citizens the right to know what their tax-paying officials negotiated in closed-door meetings and how they protected and advanced U.S. interests.
PS Among the more than half a million documents and telegrams declassified by the State Department to date, there are also details about the “Meghri version of the territory exchange” discussed during Robert Kocharyan’s reign, which “Azatutyun” will present next.
By the same logic, one day in the near future, documents about the negotiations that took place after that, before the 44-day war and the fall of Artsakh, will perhaps also appear in the State Department archives.