Armenia as a Bridge, Not a Battleground

Armenians head to the polls this June for their first regularly scheduled parliamentary elections in nine years. Since 2022, Yerevan has reconfigured its foreign policy away from the historically close relationship with Russia, progressed in (often lopsided) normalization talk with Azerbaijan and Turkey and challenged Armenians’ historical and cultural beliefs. The summer vote is expected to be a referendum on the government’s controversial policies and vision for the country’s new “era of peace.” In this restless domestic environment, an array of external actors is seeking to influence the election and Armenia’s strategic trajectory. Rather than pursuing a “with us or against us” approach, those states seeking to influence the election would be wise to recognize that Armenia can serve as a far better bridge than battleground.

Kaja Kallas, the European Union’s top diplomat, said in December that Armenia had asked Brussels for “help to fight the malign influence, like we granted to Moldova.” The “malign influence” is referencing anticipated Russian interference. Alluding to Brussels’ support for Moldova as the inspiration, Kallas openly acknowledges the EU’s plan to influence Armenia’s election on the ruling party’s behalf.

Last September, Moldova’s ruling Party of Action and Solidarity (PAS) maintained its majority in the country’s most consequential parliamentary election. Before that vote, Moldovan President Maia Sandu stressed that a defeat for PAS would mean a Russian victory and could lead the country into war. As an EU accession frontrunner, Brussels saw a crucial stake in the outcome of the Moldovan vote and expended significant resources to demonstrate the Bloc’s resolve and support for PAS. This followed $2 billion in announced financial assistance from 2024, when Moldova narrowly passed a referendum enshrining the country’s EU aspirations into its constitution.

Such support from Brussels—in the name of supporting democracy and resisting Russian interference—led to Chisinau banning two parties from competing just days before the vote. Labeling the parties “pro-Russian” led the EU to turn a blind eye to an obviously undemocratic action on the eve of a contentious vote.

While generally supportive, the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe’s post-election findings noted that Moldova’s Central Election Commission undertook “occasionally politically aligned decisions” that “called into question its impartiality and independence.”

Backing the ruling party in Armenia’s election offers Brussels the opportunity to nurture pro-European sentiments among Armenians, encourage the country’s continued distancing from Russia and secure EU strategic interests in the wider region. (This is especially true as the EU’s influence wanes in Georgia.)

Nevertheless, the EU must recognize that such partial support risks eroding what little power the Bloc’s emphasis on norms and values holds in a rapidly changing international system.

Russian influence in Armenia is widespread, and Moscow is interested in influencing the upcoming elections, even if only to cause disarray. Over the last 35 years, Armenia has been Russia’s strategic ally in the region. Moscow maintains a small but symbolically significant military base near the Armenia-Turkey border, and Russia’s economic ties with Armenia extend across several strategic industries.

Following the 2020 Nagorno-Karabakh War and Russia’s 2022 invasion of Ukraine, however, Armenia has successfully deepened its relations with the U.S. and EU member states. Moscow is wary of increasing American, Turkish and European influence, especially through the Trump Route for International Peace and Prosperity (TRIPP). Russia’s focus on Ukraine has decreased its influence in the South Caucasus, prompting a push to regain sway in Armenian politics.

According to Russia’s Vedomosti, Sergei Kiriyenko, the influential first deputy head of the presidential administration, now leads Moscow’s strategy toward Armenia. Recent reports discuss Moscow’s “new approach to soft power,” with Armenia prioritized in 2026.

As Yerevan increases public comments on Russia’s interference, it will be critical how this develops and whether the government continues to pursue a Moldovan-esque approach toward opposition voices.

Azerbaijan and Turkey have an interest in seeing Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan’s party remain in power, too. Pashinyan is the most willing Armenian leader to engage in negotiations with Azerbaijan since the late 1990s, when Yerevan possessed a stronger bargaining position. In an effort to demonstrate progress, Turkey’s President Recep Tayyip Erdogan recently expressed optimism that Turkey “hopefully will be taking some symbolic steps” toward normalization in 2026. Azerbaijan’s President Ilham Aliyev also approved the mostly symbolic transit of goods between his country via Georgia and Armenia.

Yerevan’s role as Washington’s only regional strategic partner incentivizes American backing for Pashinyan. The TRIPP project adds further impetus, as dislike of the project is widespread among the variegated Armenian opposition. For the U.S., the TRIPP project is more than an effort at establishing peace between Armenia and its two neighbors; if successful, it could offer Washington an opportunity to compete in Eurasia’s heartland on issues of strategic significance.

While the June election is for Armenians to decide, various international actors hope to influence the result for their own benefit. This dynamic risks turning Armenia (and the South Caucasus) into a battleground rather than the bridge it should become.

Artin DerSimonian is a junior research fellow in the Eurasia Program at the Quincy Institute for Responsible Statecraft, where his work focuses on Russian foreign policy in the former Soviet Union and U.S.-Russia relations. He earned a master of science from the University of Glasgow in Russian, East European and Eurasian Studies.