A Comprehensive Overview of Israeli Arms Exports to Azerbaijan

During the buildup to hostilities in Nagorno-Karabakh last September, cargo flights from Azerbaijan to Israel noticeably increased. Between March and September 2023, at least 11 flights departed Ovda airbase in southern Israel bound for Baku [source]. This represents 72 flights in a 7 year span to Azerbaijan. Ovda airbase, previously a joint civilian airport, is technically defunct [source]. Cordial relations between Israel and Azerbaijan are strengthen by a mutual desire to see an aggressive Iran contained.

Israeli arms exports to Azerbaijan are well documented. Much attention is given to how advanced Israeli weapons systems impacted Azerbaijan’s multi-decade long conflict with Armenia. How much of a difference did Israeli weapons make in Azerbaijan’s eventual victory over Armenia? Do Israeli weapons make Azerbaijan a near peer competitor with Iran? Would Israeli weapons level the playing field in a low intensity conflict with Tehran?

1. Silk Way Airline Express

Silk Way Airline is a privately held Azeri cargo airline which operates routes to over half a dozen locations. Its fleet consists primarily of Ilyushin Il-76TD’s and two Boeing 747’s. During the onset of the 2020 Nagorno-Karabakh War, allegations surfaced that Silk Way was contracted by the Azeri government to ship Israeli made weapons to Azerbaijan. But how accurate are these claims? Let’s review some of the more incendiary allegations made about Silk Way.

• According to a Bulgarian investigative media group, Silk Way “exploits” a legal loophole in aviation regulations by applying for diplomatic exemptions [source].
• This exemption allows Silk Way to fly in, for example, white phosphorus shells to conflict zones. The Azeri Embassy in Sofia categorically denied the accusations [source].
• Silk Way has been accused of conducting “secret flights” for the US Department of Defense in support of the US Special Operations Command (USSOCOM) operations in Afghanistan [source].
• Saudi Arabia and the UAE allegedly use Silk Way aircraft to supply militants in Syria and Iraq with weapons manufactured in Eastern Europe. These shipments are deliberately masked through diplomatic intermediaries [source].
• Some of these weapons allegedly made their way into the hands of ISIS militants in Syria [source].

The evidence that Silk Way is the chief weapons mule of the Azeri government is indeed only circumstantial. But, the circumstances which create that evidentiary corpus are also abundant. And despite the Azeri government’s insistence to its Bulgarian counterparts that Silk Way is not flying potentially dangerous cargo through its airspace, their refutations are not particularly convincing.

1.1 Unlikely Explanations 

For example, if Silk Way is indeed a privately held airline, why did the Azeri Ministry of Foreign affairs put its own neck out to refute those claims? Why would the government of Azerbaijan make a point of refuting incendiary claims about an air carrier that supposedly has no relation to its foreign policy aims?

In 2011, a Silk Way Il-76 (4K-AZ55) was lost during a ‘controlled flight into terrain’ (CFIT) incident 25 km short of Bagram Airbase. Moreover, in 2016, a Silk Ways An-12 was lost during a botched take off at Dwyer Airbase in Lashkargah. These incidents are well documented and acknowledged. If Silk Way isn’t flying in munitions for USSOCOM, what were its aircraft doing in Bagram and Lashkargah?

1.2 The Ovda Connection 

As mentioned previously, Ovda Airbase is a facility located in the southern deserts of Israel. Initially, the airport served the tourism industry of the Red Sea resort town of Eilat. This was until it was replaced with Ramon International in 2019 [source]. Although it was only really functional during the winter tourism peak season, the frequency of flights to Ovda was the direct result of the EU’s Open Sky agreement with Tel Aviv [source].

But Ovda was not truly defunct, as the media reports might suggest. It remained functional as a military airbase. It would appear one of its main functions is facilitating Israeli arms exports to Azerbaijan.

Ovda’s significance was evidently prevalent enough to warrant targeting from Iranian proxy militias. In April of this year, for example, the Iranian backed Islamic Resistance in Iraq (IRI) launched several explosive laden drones towards the base [source]. IRI released images of al-Arqab cruise missiles on their Telegram, a clear indication that Iran directly supplied the ordnance used in the attack [source].

1.3 Two Birds, One Stone

By targeting bases such as Ovda, the Iranians appeared to be killing two birds with one stone. To be sure, the destruction of any Israeli civilian or military infrastructure aligns with Iran’s overall objective of making life painful for Tel Aviv. But it may have also been tacit revenge for Azerbaijan’s semi-overt cooperation with Israel. Let’s review what we know about Ovda and it’s relationship to Silk Way:

• Silk Way aircraft are regularly clocked arriving and departing Ovda, which is now exclusively a military installation.
• Repeated targeting by Iranian proxy militias indicates that Ovda is strategically signifiant enough to expend cruise missiles in an effort to destroy it.
• Silk Way fights to Ovda are fairly regular.

There are abundant allegations that Mossad agents who stole Iranian nuclear data transited through Azerbaijan [source]. More so, Azerbaijan’s relationship with Iran is far more combative than one may realize. Iran’s energy cooperation with Armenia was born out of a fear losing a land corridor to Armenia and the wider CSTO space.

As such, Iran built several power transmission lines into Armenia through its tiny sliver of an opening into the Caucuses [source]. Additionally, the Iranians have a long history of providing arms and ammunitions to the Armenians as far back as the 1990’s [source]. Compounding the tension, Baku has always voiced a certain level of support for Azeri separatism in northern Iran [source]. Deliberately targeting Ovda does not just hurt Israel, but Iran’s other regional antagonist, Azerbaijan.

2. So What’s the Big Idea?

So what, a cynic could argue. Plenty of countries buy weapons all the time from all over the world. Israel is just another merchant in a huge global market. Indeed, this is true, but certainly misses the broader point.

As a former satellite republic of the Soviet Empire, Azerbaijan’s military operated secondhand Russian hardware throughout the 1990’s and early 2000’s. And a lot of this ex-Soviet Russian hardware is just not very good, relative to their modern counterparts.

Let’s take, for example, the S-200 Angara missile system, operated both by Azerbaijan and Iran. The Angara is antiquated. Its missiles are rather large and bulky and do not maneuver nearly as well as modern air defence missiles. Perhaps its only selling point is a range at 150 miles, compared to a Patriot’s 90. And it certainly can lob a 478 lbs HE-Fragmentation warhead at larger, slower aircraft [source]. Indeed, the Ukrainians shot down a Russian Beriev A-50 AEW&C aircraft in February approximately 120 miles off the front lines [source].

2.1 Air Defense Upgrades All Around 

But, the S-200 is only really useful for large, cumbersome aircraft. It fell out of service in the late 60’s precisely because the US Air Force developed lighter, faster and even stealthier bombing aircraft. Think about all the videos you’ve seen pour out from the battlefields of Ukraine. For every video of a Su-25 bombing run, you can probably match it with 100 videos of small, miniature quadcopter dropping a single grenade into the open turret of a T-90 or T-72 and blowing the whole thing into high earth orbit.

The face of areal warfare has dramatically changed since the Cold War. The threats are no longer from strategic bombers like the B-1 Lancer but from your neighbors commercial hobby drone. And what’s more, 4th and 5th generation fighter aircraft are far more nimble, agile and stealthier than their 3rd generation counter parts. So where does that leave militaries like those of Azerbaijan or Iran?

• Iranian S-200 systems are being gradually phased out by the introduction of the Talash 2/3, boasting a comparable range of 150-200 km [source].
• The then Deputy Commander of Khatam Al-Anbia Air Defense Base, General Alireza Elhami, specifically stated that the Talash system would be deployed in western border regions [source].
• Azerbaijan now employs Barak 8 missile systems that are far more agile than the S-200. Additionally, Baku acquired the shorter range yet more nimble SPYDER system in 2021 [source].

Azerbaijan’s frenetic acquisitions of Israeli weapons is a fairly strong indicator that the military brass in Baku realizes that the face of warfare has dramatically changed, that old Soviet antiques simply won’t cut it any longer against an Iran which itself is boasting of its own modernization prowess.

2.2 Modern Assault Rifles

It is not just big ticket items like air defence missiles that are being revisited in Iran or Azerbaijan. Both nations recently introduced new upgrades to the individual service rifles carried by their troops. In the case of Iran, Tehran introduced new domestically produced plagiarisms of the Heckler & Koch HK416 for its frontline troops.

The Masaf Individual Service Rifle is really a strong credit towards Iran’s ability to reverse engineer weaponry it should not be generally privy too [source]. Chambered for 7.62 x 51 mm rounds, and an effective range of 800 meters, the Masaf is certainly a departure from the standard Kalashnikov pattern rifles used extensively by Iranian security forces.

Azerbaijan has been steadily equipping its special forces units with Israeli made assault rifles that are also a huge departure from the standard Kalashnikov pattern rifle. Both Marine and Special Forces units now use the IWI Tavor X95 and Tavor TAR-21. Both rifles can take 5.56×45mm NATO rounds and most notably .300 AAC Blackout ammunition. The switch over to NATO standard rounds is very telling.

2.2.1 NATO Standard Rounds

Some readers may be well acquainted with the relative performance power of the 5.56 against the 7.62. Yes, indeed, it is true that 7.62 rounds can deliver a deadly uppercut compared to the 5.56. But the relative punch delivered by the 7.62 isn’t the point.

In the event of a war between Iran and Azerbaijan, NATO countries can rapidly deliver large quantities of usable ammunition to Azerbaijan. The use of NATO standard rounds also signals an implicit ambition by Azerbaijan to better integrate their military into the western geopolitical sphere. Israeli arms exports to Azerbaijan are just one means of achieving that goal.

2.2.2 Blackout Rounds

(DISCLAIMER: The author owns a firearm which is chambered for .300 BLK. This is no way intended to act as an advertisement for Advanced Armament Corporation products)

The ability of the Tavor to utilize .300 AAC Blackout rounds may also provide a slight edge to Azeri special forces. For those unfamiliar, Blackout rounds are a relatively new addition to the panoply of ammunition options. Having personally used .300 BLK, the actual feel of the round as an Intermediate cartridge is not a major departure from NATO standard rounds in terms of execution and general firearm performance.

The only noticeable difference that really would cut the round out from its competitors is its subsonic performance when used with suppressors. The round was specifically designed to preform at lower sound thresholds than other intermediate cartridges without sacrificing stopping power. But does this really make Azeri special forces more lethal and silent than before?

Let’s take the experience of US Special Operations Command (SOCOM) as an example:

• SOCOM introduced the Sig Sauer MCX Rattler as its new personal defence weapon in 2022 [source].
• The Rattler has the option of being chambered with either 5.56 NATO and .300 Blackout [source].
• The Rattler is a relatively small rifle with a barrel measuring at 5.5 in. With shorter barrels, the average velocity behind rounds begins to taper off.
• Enter the BLK round. Despite the Rattler’s shorter barrel, the round packs a harder punch on exit and maintains similar stopping power to the 5.56 NATO [source].

Now, add a suppressor and you have yourself one powerful, lethal, quieter compact rifle. In a future potential engagement, Azeri special forces can certainly capitalize on the advantage provided by Israeli weapons. The Blackout round is not by any measure a magic bullet. In fact, it is relatively expensive. Moreover, having a military which uses a wide variety of ammunition is a logistical nightmare. There is no telling how well Azerbaijan can adapt to new logistical demands or how well it can equip its special forces units with a unique ammunition type.

2.3 New ISR Platforms

Israeli combat drones may have played an important role in securing Azeri victory during its 6 week war with Armenia in 2020 [source]. Israeli Harop suicide drones, for example, played decisive roles in eliminating Armenian heavy armor and enhancing Azerbaijan’s reach into Armenian territory.

The use of Israeli suicide drones was so prolific and effective, that even the US Army took notice and began adjusting strategic planning for future engagements as a result [source]. Azerbaijan’s bolstered arsenal of unmanned areal systems is not just limited to suicide drones. New additions from Israel include:

• Elbit Hermes 450
• IAI Heron
• IAI Searcher
• Aeronautics Defense Orbiter
• Aerostar Tactical UAS

In the case of the Defense Orbiter and Aerostar UAS, both a licensed to be produced domestically in Azerbaijan [source]. The vast majority of Azerbaijan’s UAS ISR fleet is Israeli made. In a sense, without Israel, Azerbaijan would not have a the same level of battlefield or tactical situational awareness. In modern warfare, this type of situational awareness over a battle space can truly make or break success in a military engagement.

3. Assessment and Roundup 

The question we asked at the beginning of this article is an amorphous one, to be sure. How much of a difference did Israeli weapons make in Azerbaijan’s eventual victory over Armenia?

Do Israeli weapons make Azerbaijan a near peer competitor with Iran? In the case of Armenia, almost certainly. Azerbaijan completely trounced the Armenian military in 2020 in no small part to its more robust air defence systems. Moreover, it was able to decapitate supply lines deep into Armenian territory with suicide munitions, before those supply lines had any hope of reaching front lines [source]. Armenian paralysis soon followed.

3.1 Near Peer Competition with Iran

In the case of Iran, Azerbaijan’s new Israeli weapons systems have brought it up to speed with its southern neighbor. To be clear, Azerbaijan maintains a much smaller Air Force than its Iranian counterpart.

But if the Russo-Ukrainian war has taught us anything, you don’t need a larger more sophisticated Air Force to stop a larger adversary. All one really needs to do is to deny access to airspace, and strap a grenade to a quadcopter. Israeli air defence systems like the Barak-8 certainly allow Azerbaijan to do so. Future Israeli arms exports to Azerbaijan may include more lethal UCAV type drones as well.

4. Conclusion

New Israeli additions to Azerbaijan’s arsenal certainly make its military far more lethal. In fact, its not a stretch to say that Azerbaijan’s military forces are now at a qualitative advantage compared to their Iranian counterparts. Iran has quantity and strategic depth, but Azerbaijan’s recent upgrades should give Tehran pause for thought. It is certainly likely Israeli arms exports to Azerbaijan will continue for this very reason.