A pragmatic space doctrine for Armenia’s national security

Yerevan’s biggest challenge is adjusting its defense doctrine and national security apparatus at a time following catastrophic defeat and ethnic cleansing while located in the most complex geopolitical neighborhood in the world.

When focusing on the space domain, we must acknowledge the obvious assumption that Armenia’s space needs are not the same as the US, Russia, or China. Armenia’s national security space goals should address the most pressing issues to maintain territorial integrity and save as many lives as possible.

This non-technical analysis offers opportunities to improve strategy, doctrine and intent in military space, counterspace and diplomacy. All of these goals can be realistically achieved in 5 years or less.

Earth Observation Imagery & Analysis

Imagery intelligence (IMINT) may not be as lauded as signals intelligence (communications spying) and human intelligence (spies or insider agents). IMINT may be overlooked because this form of intelligence reporting can only tell the “what” of the story, not the “why” or “how.” According to the US Naval War College, IMINT serves as “Representations of objects reproduced electronically or other optical means. Imagery can be derived from visual photography, radar sensors, infrared sensors, lasers, and electro-optics.”

IMINT cannot explain the adversary’s intent to do something because of the innate difficulty to judge intent from a still image. For example, a square kilometer displaying an adversarial group of tanks, air defense systems, and temporarily erected barracks for soldiers could suggest an attack, exercise, or something else. Yet where IMINT lacks in understanding intent, it is very strong in understanding capability.

IMINT and imagery analysis called “geospatial intelligence” (GEOINT) would prove useful for many purposes, including but not limited to informing the authorities on adversarial capabilities and activity in a variety of combat theaters such as strategic incursions at Lake Sev and Tavush Province. For military decision makers, IMINT and GEOINT can establish adversarial order of battle to understand if and how adversary assets may be implemented.

In a time of war, GEOINT is extremely useful to conduct battle damage assessment. Last, IMINT and GEOINT can be used in informational outreach to the world. Domestic and international authorities can utilize IMINT as proof of adversary capability and call for a coalition to cease adversary hostilities or even undeniable evidence of ethnic and cultural cleansing in Nagorno-Karabakh for international recognition. Finally, adversarial knowledge of their opponents’ use of IMINT will make them acutely aware of spying from space, possibly slowing the speed of training and exercises, which can negatively alter effectiveness.

How would Armenia acquire such infrastructure to support robust IMINT? Would Yerevan build satellites at home and launch them from California, Texas, Kazakhstan, or French Guiana? We must account for the possibility that Yerevan’s adversaries may attempt to seize more Republic of Armenia territory soon in the era of “might makes right.”

Rather than take many years or decades to seek available low earth orbits (LEO), manufacture, and launch space architecture, it is imperative that Armenia procure imagery from Western LEO providers. Armenia can offer these private sector companies lucrative incentives such as investment for ground architecture to receive, process, and analyze imagery. Artificial intelligence and tech are booming in Armenia. A special contract or relationship between Armenian businesses and government with the Western space provider may supplement a need that the Western provider may have never realized it was missing.

It’s worth noting that four students recently defeated Boeing and other industry giants in an air defense competition, this should give Armenian STEM hope that education and ambition can at times triumph over establishment and legacy systems.

Military Satellite Communications (SATCOM)

Effective communication and understanding between parties are the most basic principles that humans endure every day in countless iterations. It is logical to assess that the rugged terrain of Armenian mountains, including some border regions, may negatively impact communications due to bad weather and low population density. During a crisis or conflict, it is imperative that political and military leaders understand the exact nature of security issues in real time. Space-based communications platforms likely improve command and control (C2).

While reliable reporting is limited on the communication infrastructure of the Armenian military, we can infer that SATCOM may also improve communications security (COMSEC), if communications spying was not already an issue.

Armenia can model from Western allies such as South Korea, a country which also maintains utmost focus on opposing conventional military’s border encroachment and threats. According to Via Satellite, it seems Seoul is utilizing space infrastructure for military communications, position, navigation and timing

It cannot be without mentioning that Armenia is making significant inroads with SpaceX as Starlink will soon deploy to Armenia. This will greatly impact the private sector and may have a utility within the national security and military apparatus.

Counterspace Doctrine

Counterspace is also a relatively new concept in modern warfare that seeks to deny, degrade, or even destroy an opponent’s access to space infrastructure. No pragmatic Armenian counterspace doctrine should call for Yerevan to sling anti-satellite missiles into space at a moment’s notice. Armenian counterspace doctrine should call for investment, development and/or procurement of satellite jamming technology to deny adversarial C2 and intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR) and PNT.

Perhaps the most crucial aspect of counterspace doctrine should be to integrate air defense systems (IADS) with jamming technology to deny the adversary for C2, ISR, and PNT. Azerbaijan found success in its conquest of Artsakh and attacks against several Republic of Armenian towns, specifically in large part from the Bayraktar TB-2 drone.

As the world has learned from Global War on Terror, Russia-Ukraine War and elsewhere, drones are not only an effective air to ground weapon, they also have a surveillance function for squads, platoons, and companies. Satellite jamming should be another tool for the defending Armenian troops to degrade adversarial drone platforms to deny the adversary the air domain.

Counterspace doctrine to acquire such capabilities should be similar to Western space outreach.

Space Diplomacy Doctrine

Space diplomacy is arguably the most overt path to garner the attention of the Western national security space market through public and private research initiatives.

Armenia has already found tremendous success in the public space sector through its hosting of international scientists to study Mars on Armenian soil. According to Civilnet in April 2024, “AMADEE-24 concluded a month-long analog training mission for a future journey to Mars in Armenia’s central Ararat region. Managed by the Austrian Space Forum, the mission brought six analog astronauts to Armenia to carry out an array of experiments, backed by hundreds of researchers and staff from more than two dozen countries. The mission has been a catalyst for Armenia’s burgeoning domestic space industry, which is now setting its sights on producing its own spacesuits, supporting its own analog astronauts, and setting up the region’s first space laboratory.”

Meanwhile, a high concentration of the Armenian diaspora lives in greater Los Angeles, California, home of NASA’s Jet Propulsion Laboratory. Perhaps Armenian space diplomacy doctrine can call for a two-pronged strategy of sending homeland-based scientists to California to work at NASA with support from diaspora individuals and organizations. The homeland based scientific community could in turn welcome the American and Armenian-American scientists to Armenia to teach and research. Grassroots academic collaboration between nations has already begun and must grow.

Finally, the famous Byurakan Observatory could also be a strong space diplomacy asset to improve space situational awareness cooperation with the West, including partnerships with reputable American universities in space science.

Following the ethnic cleansing of over 100,000 Armenians and indicators from neighbors on carving-up more territory, Armenia needs more from its national security doctrine. Turkish media already reports robust space success as a component of Ankara’s national security. It is also conceivable that space infrastructure assisted Azerbaijan’s military successes.

Now, Armenia must take advantage of and utilize space for territorial integrity and security.

Jack Dulgarian is a professional analyst and consultant working in national security and defense. In 2023, he authored an analysis scenario-casting how Russia would thwart Armenia’s security prior to the fall and ethnic cleansing of Artsakh.