The Armenian Genocide: Between Diplomatic Pragmatism and Moral Obligation

The Armenian Genocide, deeply embedded in the national psyche and collective identity, has naturally shaped Armenian political discourse. The country’s foreign policy regarding the issue of the genocide, especially its international recognition, has varied from one administration to the other, reflecting the complexity of balancing historical justice with geopolitical pragmatism. The issue has long been intertwined with Armenia’s relations with the diaspora and efforts to normalize ties with Turkey and open the closed border. While each of the four post-independence leaders of Armenia have pursued varying policies, none has made genocide recognition by Turkey a precondition for normalization of ties.

Pre-independence and Levon Ter-Petrosyan (1988–1998)

The Pan-Armenian National Movement (HHSh), which emerged from the Karabakh Movement, successfully advocated for the formal condemnation of the Armenian Genocide by the Soviet Armenian legislature on November 22, 1988. After winning a parliamentary majority in mid-1990, the pro-independence movement began drafting a Declaration of Independence. One of the most contentious issues centered on how, or whether, to reference the Armenian Genocide in this foundational document revealing a deeper tension between diplomatic pragmatism and the perceived moral obligation to honor historical memory. Ultimately, Article 11 of the Declaration, adopted on August 23, 1990, states: “Armenia stands in support of the task of achieving international recognition of the 1915 Genocide in Ottoman Turkey and Western Armenia.”

Levon Ter-Petrosyan, who served as chairman of the legislature (then called the Supreme Council), notably opposed including any mention of the genocide in the declaration. Another opponent, Rafayel Ishkhanyan, argued that Ter-Petrosyan had “convincingly explained” that referencing the genocide was “not correct from a political and diplomatic point of view.” Ishkhanyan further remarked that the “simplistic emotional Armenian [perspective] once again triumphed over reason.” Despite these objections, only 25 deputies out of 260 voted against mentioning the genocide in the Declaration.

Ter-Petrosyan, who became the first president of Armenia shortly after the September 1991 independence referendum, did not make genocide recognition an active foreign policy demand. He stated that the issue was simply not discussed during contacts with Turkish officials. He told Volkan Vural, a Turkish diplomat, that while he could not forget the past, he did not want to live in it, expressing his desire to build a future for coming generations.

Historian Ashot Sargsyan, an ally of Ter-Petrosyan, has argued that his approach to “agree to disagree” on the genocide was diplomatically “unassailable” and left Turkey without any justification for keeping the borders closed. Sargsyan argues that consequently, wheat was supplied to Armenia via Turkey during the war in Nagorno-Karabakh (Artsakh). However, Ankara later sealed the border in 1993, not because of the genocide, but in response to the Armenian capture of Kelbajar outside the former Nagorno-Karabakh Autonomous Oblast during the first Karabakh war.

In 2007, as Ter-Petrosyan made a comeback to run for president, he stated during a rally that he did not place genocide recognition “at the foundation of Armenia’s foreign policy” as he considered it a “dangerous undertaking.” At the time, his successor and then-incumbent President Robert Kocharyan accused him of being “ready to forget the genocide and turn Armenia into an appendage of Turkey.” In response, Ter-Petrosyan pointed to the Armenian Genocide Museum which opened near the Tsitsernakaberd memorial in 1995, during his presidency, and the international conference on the 80th anniversary of the genocide in Yerevan the same year, attended by many prominent scholars.

Robert Kocharyan (1998–2008)

In his September 25, 1998 speech at the UN, Robert Kocharyan emphasized the importance of the international acknowledgement of the genocide. He told the General Assembly that recent recognitions and condemnations of the Armenian Genocide demonstrated “an increased understanding of the necessity to combat that evil.” In 1999, he stated that while recognition was historically a diaspora task, “it is also an important task for my government,” predicting that “joint efforts will result in recognition of the genocide within the next few years.” His administration’s 2007 National Security Strategy formalized Armenia’s pursuit of universal recognition, including by Turkey.

In an April 2005 letter to Kocharyan, Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan proposed establishing “a joint group consisting of historians and other experts” to study the “events of 1915” in the archives and “to share their findings with the international public.” He argued it would contribute to normalization of ties and “create a friendly and more peaceful climate.” Kocharyan rejected the proposal, arguing that addressing the past required first creating a “conducive political environment” and that governments, not historians, should develop bilateral relations.

In an informal document, Armenia’s Foreign Ministry noted that Turkey has historically called for historians to examine the “events of 1915” whenever facing international pressure about genocide recognition. While Erdogan’s proposal was unprecedented in being both written and issued at the highest level, the MFA considered it insincere. It was leaked to Turkish media before it was formally delivered to Armenia, circulated in the U.S. Congress to create the impression that reconciliation was underway, and followed by a Turkish parliamentary resolution reinforcing denialist views.

Ter-Petrosyan criticized Kocharyan for exploiting genocide recognition to exact diaspora support. He condemned Kocharyan’s 1998 UN speech as “hollow and inconsequential”, arguing that this “careless” approach provoked Turkey’s historian commission proposal, which questions the genocide.

In private, Kocharyan appeared to use genocide recognition as leverage to pressure Turkey to open the border. According to a diplomatic cable leaked by WikiLeaks, Kocharyan told Matthew Bryza, Deputy U.S. Assistant Secretary of State, in March 2007, that diaspora groups had been pressing him to support passage of the Congressional genocide resolution, but he had refused: “I don’t need it. What I need is the border open and an opportunity to offset the giant trade imbalance with Turkey.” Similarly, Foreign Minister Vartan Oskanian told Bryza in July 2007 that should Turkey open its border and normalize relations with Armenia, he would immediately travel to Washington to persuade Capitol Hill allies and Armenian-American advocacy groups to postpone a Congressional genocide resolution. Oskanian indicated that even a partial concession—such as Turkey restoring railroad traffic on the existing Kars-Gyumri line—could prompt Armenia to engage with diaspora organizations.

Serzh Sargsyan (2008–2018)

Shortly after taking office, third President Serzh Sargsyan launched “football diplomacy” in an effort to normalize ties with Turkey. During a June 2008 visit to Russia, he stated that Armenia “does not mind” establishing a commission that would study the historic facts, but “only when the border between our countries is opened.” Foreign Minister Eduard Nalbandian assured at the time that Yerevan will continue to seek international recognition of the genocide.

Sargsyan’s openness to a historical commission faced widespread opposition, as critics across the political spectrum viewed it as a Turkish maneuver to discourage further international genocide recognition. Among its opponents were the junior coalition partner ARF (Dashnaktsutyun) party, former foreign ministers Raffi Hovannisian and Vartan Oskanian, and Ter-Petrosyan. The latter’s Armenian National Congress (ANC) party backed the protocols in principle, despite its hostility toward Sargsyan’s government, but called the commission of historians unacceptable. Ter-Petrosyan said its creation would mean that the genocide is being called into question. Among its rare supporters was Hayk Demoyan, the director of the Armenian Genocide Museum-Institute in Yerevan, who claimed that the panel would only pose a threat to Turkey, while Armenian members would gain access to Ottoman archives and thereby be able to uncover more evidence.

Armenia-Turkey talks resulted in the signing of two protocols by Foreign Ministers Eduard Nalbandian and Ahmet Davutoglu in Zurich on October 10, 2009. They called for “a dialogue on the historical dimension with the aim to restore mutual confidence between the two nations, including an impartial scientific examination of the historical records and archives to define existing problems and formulate recommendations” through a bilateral commission. As ratification prospects dimmed, Sargsyan withdrew support for this commission, telling Der Spiegel in April 2010 that it could not function while Turkey persecuted those using the term genocide and would only serve to delay international recognition. He argued such a commission would only make sense if Turkey first admitted guilt.

Prior to the centennial commemorations in 2015, Sargsyan’s government and various local and diaspora institutions issued a “Pan-Armenian Declaration on the 100th Anniversary of the Armenian Genocide,” which expresses “the united will of Armenia and the Armenian people to achieve worldwide recognition of the Armenian Genocide and the elimination of the consequences of the Genocide, preparing to this end a file of legal claims as a point of departure in the process of restoring individual, communal and pan-Armenian rights and legitimate interests.”

Ter-Petrosyan strongly objected to the declaration, particularly its invocation of “historical justice”—a term he criticized as elastic and abstract—and its references to the 1920 Treaty of Sevres and U.S. President Woodrow Wilson’s arbitral award. He found the latter particularly worrying and warned of unforeseen consequences from what he saw as a sharp shift away from Armenia’s position of having no territorial claims. In March 2015, Ter-Petrosyan proposed his own draft of a message addressed to the international community on the genocide centennial. His draft affirmed Armenia support for the international recognition of the genocide, but emphasized that this stance was rooted “exclusively in the context of human rights and crimes against humanity.” He also made clear that Armenia had no intention of imposing its agenda on the Armenian diaspora. The proposal was criticized by Deputy Parliament Speaker Eduard Sharmazanov from the ruling Republican party, as well as by the ARF.

Nikol Pashinyan (2018–)

In May 2018, newly elected Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan committed to pursuing international recognition of the Armenian Genocide and establishing diplomatic relations with Turkey without preconditions. He emphasized that genocide recognition was primarily about prevention rather than Armenia-Turkey relations. The July 2020 National Security Strategy declared the international recognition of the Armenian Genocide, “overcoming and eliminating its consequences”, as one of the “goals of the Armenian nation.” The government’s five-year program from August 2021 further specified that genocide recognition should strengthen Armenia’s security system and reduce, not increase, regional tensions.

The Pashinyan government shifted its rhetoric after normalization efforts launched in 2021.

In April 2023, a monument dedicated to the assassins of Operation Nemesis, who targeted the perpetrators of the Armenian Genocide, was unveiled in Yerevan. This move drew strong condemnation from Turkey, which responded by temporarily closing its airspace to Armenian airlines. Pashinyan stated that the decision to install the monument was made by the Yerevan municipality and not the central government and called it a “wrong decision.” Security Council chief Armen Grigoryan said it was an internal matter, while Deputy Mayor Tigran Avinyan insisted that the monument to the “knights of national dignity” would remain and that it was “not against any people or country.”

Pashinyan caused controversy with his address on the anniversary of the genocide on April 24, 2024. He said the stateless Armenian people “became victims of geopolitical intrigues and false promises” and urged Armenians to “overcome the trauma of genocide.” The Lemkin Institute for Genocide Prevention criticized Pashinyan’s statement, which it said “appears to engage in victim blaming” and “apparent agreement with key points” in Turkish and Azerbaijani “denialist narratives.” Greg Sarkissian, President of the Zoryan Institute, argued that the Lemkin Institute’s statement was “unnecessary and irresponsible” as it “falsely interpret[ed] the overall essence” of Pashinyan’s statement.

In October 2024, Foreign Minister Ararat Mirzoyan told a parliament hearing that the international recognition of the genocide international “is not our number one priority.”

In January 2025, Pashinyan made controversial remarks during a meeting with the Armenian community of Zurich, Switzerland. Pashinyan specifically stated: “We must also revisit the history of the Armenian genocide. We must understand what happened and why it happened, how we perceived it and through whom we perceived. How is it that in 1939 there was no Armenian genocide [recognition] agenda and how is it that in 1950 the Armenian genocide agenda emerged?” The implication, as Vicken Cheterian has explained, was that it was the Soviet leadership who raised the issue for their own political purposes.

ARF leader Gegham Manukyan accused Pashinyan of being a collaborationist who “serves only Turkey and Azerbaijan.” Tigran Abrahamyan of the Republican Party charged him with denial of the genocide. The Lemkin Institute said Pashinyan’s remarks “echo Turkish denialist narratives.” Pashinyan himself denied questioning the genocide. “Denial of the genocide is a criminal offense in Armenia. The fact of the genocide is indisputable and undeniable,” he said.

In a March 2025 interview to Turkish media outlets in Yerevan, Pashinyan reiterated that the international recognition of the Armenian Genocide is “not among our foreign policy priorities today.” He emphasized that the genocide remains “an indisputable truth” in Armenia and among Armenians which “is impossible to either deny or reject.”  Pashinyan reflected on the emotional response such recognitions often elicit, noting that while Armenians may feel elated when distant countries acknowledge the genocide, the impact is short-lived. He questioned the practical value of these recognitions in the context of Armenia’s immediate regional relations, especially during periods of heightened tension, and their influence on promoting peace and stability in the region.

Conclusion

Although Armenia’s Declaration of Independence explicitly affirms the importance of genocide recognition, successive post-Soviet administrations have taken varied approaches to the international campaign. None, however, has made recognition a precondition for normalizing relations with Turkey, reflecting a consistent pattern of deprioritizing the issue in favor of geopolitical or regional gains. While each government has upheld the genocide as a defining historical, cultural, and moral truth, its role in foreign policy has been shaped primarily by considerations of state interest and diplomatic strategy.

Ter-Petrosyan, at the foundational stages, made it clear that recognition should not conflict with the strategic interest of the new republic. Kocharyan paid lipservice to the importance of genocide recognition, yet instrumentalized it as a tool of recalibrating relations with Turkey. Sargsyan made the fundamental policy decision that it should not, in any way, create a barrier to advancing Armenia’s regional interests and normalizing relations with Turkey. And the current Pashinyan administration has not changed the consistency of the Armenian state’s underlying policy: the normalization of relations with Turkey and the strategic advancement of Armenia’s interests in the region take precedent over genocide recognition.

To this end, when observing the relationship between the politics of genocide recognition and the decades-old process of Armenia-Turkey normalization, relations have been strained not due to the successive Armenian governments’ stance on genocide recognition, but rather by the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict and Ankara’s close alignment with Baku.