The Political Book of the Year: Ken Khachigian’s Behind Closed Doors: In the Room With Reagan & Nixon

Francis P. Sempa

Spectator.org

Ken Khachigian, who worked as an aide and speechwriter to Presidents Richard Nixon and Ronald Reagan, has written a marvelous memoir of those days that will delight political junkies and inform scholars and historians of the period. His book, Behind Closed Doors: In the Room with Reagan & Nixon, transports us back to the finale of the Watergate saga, where he and a few other brave Nixon loyalists sought to convince the president to fight against what the British historian Paul Johnson rightly called a “media putsch,” and what Geoff Shepard has shown to be a political coup d’etat by Democrats, the media, the special counsel’s office, and partisan federal judges. When he went to work for Reagan, Khachigian served as a confidential go-between for Nixon and Reagan, which allowed the former but “disgraced” president to secretly funnel political and policy ideas to candidate and President Reagan. Along the way, Khachigian deliciously settles scores with the Nixon aides (especially Al Haig and David Gergen) who were complicit in arranging Nixon’s resignation and those Reagan aides (James Baker, Richard Darman, David Gergen again, Richard Wirthlin, and others) who didn’t want to let Reagan be Reagan in campaigns or as president.

Khachigian joined the Nixon administration under the tutelage of Patrick J. Buchanan, the feisty wordsmith and policy adviser who, Khachigian writes, became a “mentor, colleague, and lifelong friend.” Buchanan, like Khachigian, served in both the Nixon and Reagan administrations and, like Khachigian, has remained a steadfast loyalist to both presidents. At the beginning of August 1974, Khachigian was asked to join a “working group” that he thought was convened to save Nixon’s presidency. He soon learned, however, that Nixon’s “forces were folding tents at the first whiffs of gunpowder.” Khachigian wrote a strongly worded and compellingly argued memo to Nixon “pleading that he reject resignation,” but Nixon never got to see the memo. By then, Khachigian writes, Nixon’s defenders inside the White House could be counted on one hand — and he and Buchanan were two of them. Rose Mary Woods, Nixon’s longtime secretary, was another.

After Nixon’s resignation, Khachigian joined Nixon’s staff in San Clemente, where he helped shape Nixon’s memoirs and helped prepare him for the famous televised interviews with David Frost. Khachigian relished discussions with Nixon on politics, politicians, world leaders, and personal and political gossip. “Our conversations,” he writes, “were enriched by three decades of [Nixon’s] vast insights, knowledge, and background into the American and international world of politics and government.” Those dialogues with Nixon, Khachigian explains, “would prove indispensable to the success of my relationship with Ronald Reagan.”

Nixon early on grasped Reagan’s “genius as a communicator,” and through Khachigian the former president became an unseen confidential adviser to Reagan in his presidential campaigns and his presidency. It was Nixon in 1978 who urged Khachigian to work on Reagan’s campaign for the presidency. Nixon admired Reagan and especially appreciated Reagan’s loyalty to him throughout the turmoils of Vietnam and Watergate. Nixon thought John Connally, who had served as his treasury secretary, was tougher and smarter than Reagan. But he believed Reagan had a better chance of winning because of his unequalled communication skills. Nixon also introduced Khachigian to Stuart Spencer, who had been with Reagan in his California gubernatorial campaigns, but who had worked for President Gerald Ford against Reagan in the 1976 GOP primaries. Khachigian credits Spencer for being the best of Reagan’s campaign strategists.

Nixon’s brilliant post-presidential books ensured that his ideas and concepts would remain relevant to global geopolitics and presidential politics. Nixon’s The Real War, for example, was released during the 1980 presidential campaign. His next book, Real Peace, came out in the midst of the 1984 presidential campaign. But having Khachigian inside the Reagan campaign and White House provided Nixon with a direct avenue to advise and influence Reagan’s campaign and presidency. Throughout the book, Khachigian quotes from the memos and letters Nixon sent to Reagan via Khachigian. (Several of those memos and letters appear in the book’s appendix, and are worth reading in full.) And there were phone calls, as well, where Nixon would provide political and policy advice for Reagan through Khachigian. And Nixon undoubtedly had other Reagan campaign and White House staffers that he could utilize as intermediaries for advice to Reagan.

Khachigian valued his role as intermediary between Nixon and Reagan because he respected Nixon’s experience, political wisdom, and knowledge about world affairs. Nixon’s advice helped Khachigian navigate the sometimes troubled waters of Reagan’s campaigns and his presidency. The infighting among Reagan’s campaign staff and his administration is well-known, but Khachigian provides an insiders view from someone who shared Reagan’s conservative philosophy.

During the 1980 campaign, Khachigian made almost daily recordings of events, personalities, and his perceptions that resulted in a thirty-five thousand word campaign diary. This is invaluable source material because it is not shaped by hindsight. He describes it as “contemporaneous observations [by] an author with a principal role in shaping winning messages and participating in many key campaign decisions at strategic turning points as a senior member of Reagan’s campaign staff.” As the campaign wore on, both Ronald and Nancy Reagan grew more comfortable with Khachigian and more reliant on his role in shaping the campaign’s key messages.

The key message of the 1980 campaign was the economy. Nixon urged Khachigian to focus on the poor economic record of the incumbent Carter administration. Inflation, unemployment, and high interest rates were what Americans most cared about. Reagan instinctively understood that. But foreign policy crises, especially the hostage crisis in Iran and the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, were also key campaign issues that played in Reagan’s favor. Some Reagan campaign advisers, like James Baker, wanted to soften Reagan’s message, especially when it came to tax cuts. Influenced by economists like Arthur Laffer, scholars like Jude Wanniski, and politicians like Congressman Jack Kemp (who had served with Reagan in California), Reagan had become a supply-sider, arguing that cutting tax rates across the board would increase revenues to the government. Nixon predicted that Reagan would win comfortably as long as the campaign kept the economy front and center. Reagan won a landslide victory.

The infighting continued after Reagan was sworn in as president. Khachigian helped draft Reagan’s first inaugural address, which emphasized the goals of scaling-back the federal government, unleashing private enterprise, providing tax relief to all Americans, and combating the Soviet Union. Khachigian refutes the notion that Reagan was a passive president. “The weight of his presence was greater and more emphatic than history has given him credit,” he writes. Reagan was, writes Khachigian, “intensely involved in the minutiae of his challenge.” “We came here to do things differently,” Reagan told his cabinet officers at the first meeting. And, Khachigian notes, Reagan was anything but passive when it came to editing drafts of speeches — that continued throughout his eight years as president.

Among Reagan’s top White House staffers, only Ed Meese was philosophically in tune with Reagan’s core beliefs, but Meese was up against Baker, Michael Deaver, David Stockman (OMB Director), pollster Richard Wirthlin, and others who preached “pragmatism” over conservatism. Reagan, Khachigian writes, “was surrounded by accommodationists who convinced themselves that at his core, Reagan was also a pragmatist.” The main villain here, according to Khachigian, was Jim Baker who often falsely claimed credit for Reagan achievements, deflected blame from himself when things didn’t go right, looked to destroy potential rivals within the administration, sometimes hid information from the president, and serially leaked to the media to promote himself and his agenda. But Baker wasn’t the only one. Baker’s deputy Richard Darman was another, as was David Gergen. Later, during Reagan’s second term, Donald Regan, who switched jobs with Baker to become chief of staff (Baker became Treasury Secretary), let his power-hungry ambition get in the way of pursuing the president’s agenda. Khachigian accuses these staffers as having engaged in “duplicity and underhanded conduct,” and refers to them as “little men swaggering in oversized shoes.”

Nixon offered advice via Khachigian during the 1984 presidential campaign, especially after Reagan did not do well in the first debate with Democratic candidate Walter Mondale. Nixon said to let Reagan be Reagan, setting forth broad themes and noting the first term’s accomplishments instead of memorizing a bunch of facts and figures. Reagan was so far ahead in the polls, Nixon said, that he could lose both debates and still win the election comfortably. Reagan won the second debate, and duplicated Nixon’s 49-state victory in November.

Reagan’s second term was marred by problems — the visit to the West German military cemetery at Bitburg where some SS troops were buried, and the Iran-contra scandal. Reagan had promised German Chancellor Helmut Kohl that he would visit Bitburg as a symbol of healing the wounds of the Second World War which had ended forty years before. When it became known that some SS troops were buried there, Reagan was urged by Holocaust survivors, political leaders, some in the administration, and his wife Nancy to cancel the visit, but Reagan gave his word to Kohl and kept it. He also visited the Bergen-Belsen death camp, where he delivered one of his finest speeches, mostly written by Khachigian. Nixon told Khachigian that Reagan’s Bitburg visit showed strength and political courage that Soviet leaders would understand.

Reagan survived the political and legal slings and arrows thrown at him during the Iran–Contra scandal, despite what Khachigian describes as “the rush from Reagan’s ranks to deride and ridicule him … that gave good names to rats leaving the sinking ship.” There was an “unconstrained flow of leaks” to the press, including, according to Khachigian, pollster Wirthlin providing the press with polling data that showed the public believed Reagan was lying and hiding information about the scandal. After the scandal subsided, writes Khachigian, Reagan “renewed his crusade and moved forward to shatter the Soviet empire.”

Khachigian makes clear that during campaigns and his presidency, Reagan’s most trusted adviser was his wife Nancy. He credits Nancy and British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher with persuading Reagan to shift from Soviet hardliner to negotiator-in-chief after Mikhail Gorbachev came to power in the Soviet Union. Khachigian noticed the change when Reagan edited some of his speeches in a way that toned down the usual “evil empire” rhetoric. Nancy was determined to erase the notion that her husband was a “warmonger.” She needn’t have worried. Reagan won the Cold War without firing a shot.

Toward the end of this fascinating memoir, Khachigian settles one more score — this time with Ken Duberstein, who served as Reagan’s last chief of staff. Reagan had asked Khachigian to draft his Farewell Address, but Duberstein at Nancy Reagan’s insistence had Peggy Noonan draft it. Duberstein never informed Khachigian about the change; he only learned of it from Mari Maseng decades later when he was writing this book. Khachigian doubts that Duberstein ever informed Nancy that Khachigian was supposed to draft the address. At least Darman “wielded his knives frontally in open daylight,” Khachigian writes. “Duberstein preferred to slide the stiletto in the still of night.”

In the book’s final chapter, Khachigian recounts being at a meeting with Nixon and Reagan at the dedication of Nixon’s presidential library in July 1990. It was a meeting of political giants — lions who “had shaped three decades of the twentieth century.” They talked of serious things — communist infiltration of the country in the 1940s and 1950s; past political campaigns; and the anticipated end of the Cold War. Both of those presidents contributed greatly to the Cold War’s end and, thereby, preserved the freedom and liberty of America and the West. Khachigian’s final thought summarizes this great book: “What wonderful good fortune for me to have been at their service, and, for the country, for each of them to have served.”